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The Unwed Father and the Right to
Know of His Child's Existence
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rights of unwed fathers' vis a vis their
illegitimate children3 have received increased attention. Until a
few years ago, 4 unwed fathers were ignored by or received virtu-
ally no protection from either the United States Constitution or
This note uses "unwed father" instead of the perhaps more common term "putative
father." The latter is a legal term of art and is defined as "[t]he alleged or reputed father
of an illegitimate child." BLAcK's LAw Dic~ioNARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979). The reason
"unwed father" is used here is two-fold. First, the generally accepted usage of "putative
father" is both overinclusive and underinclusive for purposes of this Note. "Putative
father," for example, "may be used to refer both to biological fathers whose identities
are known and to those who have acknowledged paternity." Comment, Delineation of the
Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood Perspective, 15 SaroN
HAiL L. Rv. 290, 290 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Delineation of the Boundaries];
see Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems
in Implementation, 13 J. FAm. L. 115, 119 n.26 (1973-74) [hereinafter Comment, Protecting
the Putative Father's Rights]. In contrast "unwed father," as used here, generally refers
to biological fathers who are ignorant of their paternity. The phrase may also refer to
biological fathers whose identities are not known with certainty-even by the biological
mother. Second, "unwed father," as used here refers to the biological father in fact-
regardless of whether he is "alleged or reputed" to be a father.
2 The use of the adjective "illegitimate" to refer to children born out of wedlock
has come under increased attack in recent years. The adjective is said to be disparaging.
Moreover, it is unfair in that the person burdened with the adjective played no role in the
event that led to his out-of-wedlock status. Instead of being called illegitimate children, or
the more offensive "bastards," it has been suggested that the terms "out-of-wedlock
children" or "nonmarital children" should be used. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, New Trends
and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L.
REv. 10, 53 n.228 (1975). Despite the author's agreement with the objections to the use
of the term "illegitimate" in this context, the term will nevertheless be used in this Note
to avoid confusion and to remain consistent with the Supreme Court's usage of the term.
See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-94 (1979); FATHERS, HusBArNs
AN Lovwas: LEGAL RIGHTS & RasPoNsmILIrnas 3-8 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds. 1979)
[hereinafter FATHmS, Husamos AND LovERs]; Doskow, The Constitution, Notice, and
the Sins of the Fathers, 8 J. Juv. L. 12, 15-31.(1984); Martin, Legal Rights of the Unwed
Father, 102 Mma. L. Rav. 77, 77-82 (1983).
4 See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-269 and accompanying text.
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the statutes of most states. 6 Indeed, courts7 and legislatures 8 tra-
ditionally have been openly hostile to the recognition of parental
rights of unwed fathers.9
The turning point, to the extent one is identifiable, 10 came on
April 3, 1972, when the United States Supreme Court announced
its decision in Stanley v. Illinois." For the first time, the Court
recognized that the unwed father's parental rights are afforded
some protection under the Constitution. 2 Stanley concerned the
termination of an unwed father's custodial rights, leaving unre-
solved, but forcing attention upon, a host of other questions 13
pertaining to unwed fathers' rights vis a vis their children. 4 These
issues included: whether an unwed father may inherit from a
deceased child's estate; 5 whether an unwed father may sue for
6 See infra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
I See generally G. DouTrwAnm, UimAtRuumD CouPLEs AND THE LAW 111-17 (1979);
I. SLOAN, LrviNr ToGETJraR: UNMARRiEDS AND THm LAW 34-38 (1980); Tabler, Paternal
Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed
Father, 11 J. FAm. L. 231, 245-50 (1971).
1 See generally M. BENErT, THE Poamcs OF ADOPTION 180 (1976); M. LEAVY, LAw
OF ADOPTION 46 (1968).
9 Various justifications have, over the years, been put forward to explain the hostility
shown to the unwed father. Usually they involve allegations that he is "immoral, irrespon-
sible and just plain bad," and/or that he is highly unlikely to be a good-and committed-
parent. Littner, The Natural Parents, in A STuDy OF ADOPnON PRACTiCE 21 (M. Schapiro
ed. 1956); see In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1965); Demblitz, Lehr Decision
Helps Out-of-Wedlock Newborns Find Homes, 70 A.B.A. J. 126, 127 (Jan. 1984). Re-
cently, the validity of these assumptions has been vigorously challenged as having little
basis in fact. See, e.g., L. BURGESS, TI ART OF ADOPTION 31-43 (1981); A. SoRosKy, A.
BARAN, & R. PANNOR, Ti ADOPTION TRIANGLE 49-54 (1978); see also Doskow, supra
note 3, at 22 n.71 (noting that such assertions are rarely supported by citation to legal or
to sociological authority).
10 It would perhaps be more appropriate to refer to the Stanley decision as the first
major victory for unwed fathers, rather than as'a "turning point." The protection of
unwed fathers' rights still has a long way to go. See infra notes 175-200, 276-304 and
accompanying text.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 657-59; see infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
" Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Stanley warned that the decision "embarks on a
novel concept of the natural law for unwed fathers that could well have strange boundaries
as yet undiscernible." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1 This, of course, is not meant to imply that all issues concerning unwed fathers'
rights are of constitutional dimension. Nor does this Note purport to enumerate all the
questions concerning fathers' rights that were left open by Stanley.
"1 See N. LAvosu, LrvNG TOGETHER, MARRIED OR SiNGLE: YouR LEaAL RcIGHTs 52-
55 (1976).
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the wrongful death of his child;1 6 whether and to what extent an
unwed father is obligated to support his child; 7 and, whether and
to what extent an unwed father has any rights with respect to the
custody of his child absent the special circumstances present in
Stanley.18
Perhaps the most important issue left unresolved by Stanley'9
was whether and to what extent unwed fathers have any rights
with respect to the adoption of their children." Must the unwed
father receive notice that the unwed mother has surrendered the
child for adoption? Must he be granted an opportunity to be
heard at the adoption proceeding? Must his consent be obtained
before his child cafn be adopted? Does the lack of his consent
constitute an absolute veto of the proposed adoption? Are his
adoption rights superior to those of all other persons, perhaps
even those of the unwed mother? Does the age of the child make
any difference? Is the father's prior or ongoing relationship with
the mother or the child significant? Does it matter whether the
mother surrenders the child for adoption by others or instead
keeps the child, later marries, and desires to have the child
adopted by her new husband? Is it significant that the identity of
the father cannot be ascertained with certainty? What if the
father's identity is known but he cannot be located?21
Since Stanley was decided, the Supreme Court has attempted
to resolve some of these questions.2 These decisions have, in turn,
received a great deal of attention from commentators,2 and have
16 See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355-59 (1979).
See Martin, supra note 3, at 79.
See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248-56 (1978). For a discussion of the facts
of Stanley, see infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
" This statement should perhaps be qualified. In certain cases, an unwed father's
custodial rights may be more critical than his adoption rights. For example, if the mother's
new spouse seeks to adopt the child, aside from the legal ramifications, the relationship
between the unwed father and the child might otherwise remain unchanged.
10 Some of these questions were answered in later cases. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S.
at 385-94; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253-56.
21 This Note does not purport to exhaust the list of questions pertaining to adoption
that implicate unwed fathers' rights.
2 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban, 441 U.S. at 388-94; Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 254-56; see also infra notes 107-200 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and
After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OMo ST. L.J. 313 (1984); Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed
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prompted many states to revise their statutory adoption schemes.Y
Almost without exception, however, courts, commentators, and
state legislatures have tended to ignore or to gloss over one
narrow, yet fundamental, problem that accompanies increased
protection of the unwed father's rights regarding the adoption of
his child. This problem is whether the unwed mother who surren-
ders an infant5 for adoption can unilaterally circumvent whatever
parental rights the unwed father has by falling or by refusing to
reveal the existence of the child to the father or the identity of
the father to the agency handling the adoption. 26 In other words,
does the unwed father have a right to know that he is a father?
Should he have such a right?
This Note discusses the unwed father's right to know of his
child's existence. Part I elaborates on the nature of the issue. 27
Part II discusses whether this right is protected by the Constitu-
tion, under the Court's Stanley line of cases.28 Part III examines
whether and to what extent this right is protected under present
state statutes. 29 Part IV addresses the more fundamental question
of whether recognition and protection of such a right is desira-
ble.3 0 Finally, Part V discusses the difficulties involved in pro-
tecting this right and the competing interests that must be
considered and reconciled. 31
Fathers and Adoption-How Much Process Is Due?, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 265 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Lehr v. Robertson]; Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed, but No Longer
Unprotected, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 425 (1979-80) [hereinafter Note, Putative Fathers]; Note,
Adoption: The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REv. 923 (1979-80)
[hereinafter Note, Adoption]; Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of
Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 95 (1979-80) [hereinafter Comment, Extending the
Rights of Unwed Fathers]; Comment, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of
Putative Fathers, 15 CUMB. L. Rav. 499 (1984-85) [hereinafter Comment, Removing the
Bar Sinister].
See infra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
1 The term "infant" is commonly used in the law to refer to anyone under the age
of legal majority. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 699 (defining "infancy").
As used in this Note, however, the term "infant" refers to newborns.
26 See infra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 32-78 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 79-269 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 305-405 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 406-28 and accompanying text.
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I. THE RIGHT TO KNow: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
After Stanley,32 the Supreme Court held that the Constitu-
tion's protection extends to unwed fathers with respect to the
adoption of their children.3 3 Although the Court later limited the
rights of the unwed father in the adoption context, 34 the recog-
nition that the Constitution may be implicated if unwed fathers
are denied any role in the adoption of their children prompted
many states to revise their adoption statutes to protect more fully
the rights of unwed fathers. 35
Typically, 36 these revised statutory schemes provide some
mechanism whereby the unwed father is given notice of the pro-
posed adoption of his child.37 Notice is often coupled with an
opportunity to be heard at the adoption proceeding. 38 Generally,
an effort is made to obtain his consent to the adoption. 39
This Note examines the unwed father's right to be informed
of his child's existence. 40 This issue is both broader and narrower
than whatever rights an unwed father has or does not have in the
adoption context. Full recognition of the right to know is broader
than the unwed father's adoption rights in that the right to know
would extend to cases in which the unwed mother decides to rear
the child herself. The right would vest the moment the child came
into existence. 41 Vesting would not be triggered by either the
mother's surrender of the child for adoption or the mother's
32 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
33 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-94 (1979).
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-69 (1983).
31 See infra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
16 An inherent danger exists in describing any statutory theme or trend as typical;
state statutes, and the case law interpreting them, are such that probably no two states'
laws regarding adoption are identical. The reader is cautioned to keep this in mind when
the discussion in this Note makes statutory generalizations. Such generalizations, however,
are frequently necessary; a detailed examination is unfortunately beyond the scope of this
Note and would, in any event, prove to be only minimally useful. See infra notes 270-304
and accompanying text.
37 See infra note 282 and sources cited therein.
See infra note 283 and sources cited therein.
' See infra note 290 and sources cited therein.
This right will hereinafter be referred to as "the right to know."
" To avoid any objection that the right to know would in any way interfere with a
woman's right to obtain an abortion, this Note assumes that a child "comes into existence"
only at birth. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 145-67 (1973).
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
future spouse's attempt to adopt the child.42 Logically, the right
would extend to the father-whether wed or unwed-of a child
born out of an adulterous relationship.
The right to know has a somewhat narrower procedural im-
pact on existing statutory adoption requirements. 43 For example,
when an unwed father receives actual notice of the forthcoming
adoption proceeding, 44 his right to be told is necessarily protected.
In addition, when the unwed father has remained in contact with
the mother after her pregnancy is diagnosed or is obvious,45 or
after the child is born but before it is surrendered for adoption, 46
the unwed father's right to know is protected to the extent that
he is thereby put on notice that he might be the child's father. 47
The right to know is distinguishable from the unwed father's
adoption rights in other respects. Some states "protect" an unwed
father's adoption rights by using mechanisms that do not actually
inform the father of the adoption of his child.48 A form of
"constructive notice" may be used-usually taking the form of
notice by publication. 49 Obviously, any statutory mechanism that
42 A mother may choose not to elect to surrender the child until well after the child
is born, Similarly, it may be years before a mother's spouse attempts to adopt the child.
41 For example, an unwed-or wed-father might have known of the child's exis-
tence, but might nevertheless argue that there was a violation of his right to notice of an
adoption proceeding, his right to be heard at an adoption proceeding, or his right to block
the adoption by withholding his consent.
" See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
4 For nearly every gestation period, the time will come when it will be difficult, if
not impossible, for the woman to hide her pregnancy. An unwed father who knows of
the woman's pregnancy should not later be heard to complain that his right to know has
not been protected. Knowledge of the pregnancy, in effect, provides him with constructive
notice of his potential fatherhood.
- The male should be able to count back forty weeks from the birthdate of the
child to determine whether he might be the child's father, assuming, of course, that the
father has remained in relatively continuous contact with the mother during the term of
her pregnancy.
-' There may, however, be cases in which an unwed father might reasonably believe
that the child could not be his. An abnormally long or short gestation period, the male's
knowledge that birth control devices had been used, the mother's representation to the
male concerning the child's paternity, and numerous other factors may be relevant in
determining whether the father reasonably should have been put on notice of his father-
hood.
4, See infra note 287 and sources cited therein.
41 Even in cases in which the unwed father's identity and location is known, con-
structive notice may still be the only form of notice that he receives. See infra notes 286-
89 and accompanying text.
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provides for constructive, implied, or imputed notice to or consent
by the unwed father, while "protecting" 0 the unwed father's
adoption rights, does not protect his right to know if he is
unaware of his child's existence.5'
If a state's statutory scheme does not provide for constructive
notice or some other form of implied or imputed notice or con-
sent, the right to know may still go unprotected. This is the case
in those states that still do not require notice to or consent by
the unwed father-even when his identity and location are known
by the mother and revealed to the adoption agency and/or the
court.5 2 In states that purport to require the unwed father's con-
sent to the adoption of his child,5 3 however, the right to know is
not protected when his identity or location is truly unknown or
unascertainable even to the mother.5 4 The right to know is also
not protected if the mother refuses to reveal the identity or
location of the father, lies to the agency or court about his identity
or location, or omits information necessary to the correct identi-
fication or location of the father.55
Notwithstanding this lack of coextensiveness between the right
to know and the unwed father's adoption rights,56 it is in the
adoption context that the right to know assumes its most critical
importance. This is particularly true when the child is a newborn
" The use of quotation marks perhaps alerts the reader to the author's personal
dissatisfaction with using constructive notice or other similar procedures as a shortcut to
effective protection of a right. See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination
of Parental Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, in FATHERS, HuswmAs AND LoVERS
supra note 3, at 531.
11 If constructive notice is the only means available with which to inform an unwed
father of his child's existence, then such devices could be designed so as to increase the
odds of actually accomplishing its purported end. See infra notes 406-28 and accompanying
text.
,2 See infra note 284 and sources cited therein.
" See infra note 290 and sources cited therein.
" Although the focus of this Note is on cases in which the unwed mother does in
fact know the natural father's identity, it is not the case that the mother's ignorance in
fact of his identity effectively precludes any protection of the right to know. See infra
notes 407-28 and accompanying text.
11 Cases in which the unwed mother is uncooperative might present the greatest
obstacle to effective protection of the right to know. Any effort to protect the right must
address the problems inherent in such cases. See infra note 407.
"See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
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and the infant is to be adopted by strangers.5 7 Under the statutes
of most states, any prior legal relationship between the natural
parents and their child terminates upon the adoption of that child
by a third party.18 After such an adoption, an unwed father
generally cannot obtain visitation privileges,5 9 and he has no say
in any matter pertaining to the care, the rearing, or the life of
the child, including the child's education, religious upbringing, or
medical treatment 0
In addition, in most states the adoption is statutorily irrevers-
ible except in limited circumstances. 1 Even in the absence of such
a statute, it is highly unlikely that a court would invalidate a
completed adoption because reversal would be contrary to the
best interests of the child.62 Furthermore, most states provide that
adoption records, including the child's original birth certificate,
are to be sealed once the adoption proceeding ends.63 Many
statutes impose criminal penalties on anyone responsible for the
unauthorized disclosure of information contained in these re-
cords.64
The impact of these and similar statutes upon the right to
know are enormous. Once the child is adopted, the uninformed
father has, in effect, forever lost any opportunity he might oth-
erwise have had to know his child.65 If he learns of the child's
5 In this Note, the term "stranger" with respect to an adoption refers to someone
who seeks to be an adoptive parent who is not a natural parent, a spouse of a natural
parent, or a friend or relative of a natural parent.
" See infra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
" See Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1960); Spencer v. Franks, 195 A. 306
(Md. 1937); In re Gustafson's Adoption, 183 P.2d 787 (Wash. 1947); cf. Weinschel v.
Strople, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (no statutory or common law right to
visitation privileges following adoption, but parties can enter into an agreement regarding
such privileges). But see In re Estate of Zook, 399 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1965); In re Abraham
L., 385 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); In re Adoption of N., 355 N.Y.S.2d 956
(Surr. Ct. 1974).
Adoption is defined as the "legal process pursuant to state statute in which a
child's legal rights and duties toward his natural parents are terminated and similar rights
and duties toward his adoptive parents are substituted." BLACK's LAW DIcTnoNARY, supra
note 1, at 45.
61 See infra note 296 and sources cited therein.
61 See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
63 See infra note 300 and source cited therein.
6, See infra note 301 and source cited therein.
" Even if the child is not surrendered for adoption by the unwed mother, there is
no guarantee that an unwed father will be able to develop a meaningful relationship with
his child. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269-72 (White, J., dissenting).
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existence after the adoption, he is left knowing that there is a
child somewhere that he has fathered but perhaps will never see.6
The potentially traumatic impact upon the father of such knowl-
edge is self-evident. 67
There is perhaps even more potential for psychological trauma
to the unwed father in cases in which, subsequent to the adoption
of an infant surrendered by a woman with whom the father had
had sexual relations during the relevant time period,68 the father
learns of the child's existence, but is unable to verify through the
mother whether the child was in fact his. 69 Because of the confi-
dentiality of adoption records, the father is left in the position
that he might never be able to ascertain whether a child that he
has fathered exists. This uncertainty will remain with him and
perhaps haunt him for the remainder of his life. 70
Because of the critical importance of the right to know in the
adoption context, 71 this Note's discussion of the right to know
will focus on that area. Much of the discussion of the right to
know in this Note is relevant to the non-adoption context, and
is, therefore, equally applicable to cases in which a child has not
As noted, the unwed father will generally not have access to the adoption records
and thus cannot discover the child's location. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying
text.
67 See A. SoRosKy, A. BARAN, & R. PANNOR, supra note 9, at 47-72 (1978). An
excerpt from a statement by an unwed father quoted in this source is illustrative: "I heard,
after it was too late, that it was a boy, and I will always wonder if there is a kid out
there who is mine, who looks like me, and who thinks he has a louse for a father. It
hurts more than I can express." Id. at 68.
" The "relevant time period" is somewhere between 7 to 10 months before the
child's birth.
69An unwed mother might refuse to provide verification for any one or more of
several reasons: she might make a unilateral determination that it is in the best interests
of the child for the unwed father not to be told of his paternity; she might wish to
"punish" the unwed father by leaving him in doubt; or, she might be uncertain of the
child's paternity.
70 Uncertainty can result in devastating psychological consequences. The discovery
that one may be a father serves as a traumatic event sufficient to induce "a heightened
state of emotionality that can loosely be called fear." M. SELGMrAN, HEPL.ESSNESs: ON
DEPRESSION, DEvLOpmENT, AND DEATH 53 (1975). The inability to either confirm or to
dispel the possibility through any act or omission on the victim's part can result in a
depressive state heralding the beginnings of some form of emotional disturbance. See id.
at 53-54. The resulting feelings of hopelessness can serve as a harbinger of several forms
of mental disorders. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIsTIcAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 533
(3d ed. 1987).
71 See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
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been surrendered for adoption. The types of cases that are the
primary focus of this Note, however, are those in which: an
unwed mother knows the identity and location of the father;72 the
mother surrenders the child for adoption by a stranger;73 the
father has no way74 of learning of the child's existence or upcom-
ing adoption;7 5 the father would receive notice of the adoption if
his identity and/or location were known to the court or to the
adoption agency;76 and the mother does not provide the court or
agency with the identity and/or location of the father, whether
this failure on her part be due to her absolute refusal to reveal
the information, her professed ignorance as to the information,
or her deceiving or misleading the court or agency as to this
information. 77 In these cases the right to know is of the utmost
importance. 78
II. TIM UNWED FATiER AND T=E CONSTITUTION
A. The Cases
The Supreme Court has decided only a handful of cases
concerning the rights of unwed fathers.79 The right to know has
7 Cases in which an unwed father's identity or location are in fact unknown are
more troublesome and perhaps involve somewhat different considerations. See infra notes
372-93 and 401-21 and accompanying text.
7 Cases in which the mother does not surrender the child for adoption arguably
involve additional considerations that are beyond the scope of this Note. The same may
be true in cases in which a child is not adopted by a stranger, but rather by a stepparent.
See, e.g., Adoption of Rebecca B., 137 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Cal. App. 3d 1977). See generally
Comment, A Survey of State Law Authorizing Stepparent Adoption Without the Noncus-
todial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. Rnv. 567, 567-71 (1982).
74 The type of notice referred to in this Note is formal notice-from a court or
agency-rather than "secondhand notice," such as gossip or rumor.
71 The discussion in this Note is not directed toward cases in which the unwed father
has, by virtue of his contact with the unwed mother during the final stages of pregnancy,
thereby been provided with "constructive notice" of his potential fatherhood. See supra
notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
76 Not all states have such progressive statutory schemes and practices. See infra
notes 276-95 and accompanying text.
77 In other words, this Note discusses whether and to what extent the right to know
is and should be protected when the unwed mother desires that the right not be protected.
7, See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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not been in issue in any of them. The cases, however, do provide
guidance on whether and to what extent the right to know is
presently protected by the Constitution 0
The Court first held that the Constitution extended protection
to unwed fathers in Stanley v. Illinois.81 Peter and Joan Stanley
lived together in a nonmarital relationship for eighteen years. 82
The relationship produced three children.83 Joan subsequently
died, and "Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children."' '
The state instituted a dependency proceeding, and Stanley's chil-
dren were removed from his custody and placed with court-
appointed guardians. 5
Under Illinois law, illegitimate children automatically become
wards of the state upon the death of their mother.8 6 The state
attempted to justify its actions on the grounds that "unwed
fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and that it is
unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether
particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are sepa-
rated from their children."8' 7 Stanley maintained that depriving
him of his children without a showing of parental unfitness vio-
lated the equal protection clause 8 of the fourteenth amendment.8 9
The Court held that Stanley's constitutional rights had been
violated.9 The Court, however, did not rest its decision solely on
the equal protection clause: 9'
'7See infra notes 201-69 and accompanying text.
'7 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
'2Id. at 646.
s3 Id.
9, Id.
85 Id.
6 Id.
" Id. at 647.
"Id. -
"The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
10 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645. Justice White wrote the majority opinion for the Court,
joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and for most of the opinion by Justice
Douglas. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Blackmun
joined. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or the
decision of the case. Id.
'1 The Court's reasoning has been criticized. First, the opinion was somewhat vague
as to whether Stanley's protection came from the equal protection clause, the due process
clause, or both. "While the language and reasoning ... was indicative of a due process
1987-88]
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We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law,92 Stanley
was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his
children were taken from him and that, by denying him a
hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of
their children is challenged, 93 the State denied Stanley the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,9
Under its procedural due process analysis, 95 the Court first
identified the private interest involved as "that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised," ' and concluded that "absent
a powerful countervailing [state] interest," 97 Stanley's interest war-
ranted protection. 98 The Court took careful note of the constitu-
tional protection that had been accorded the family relationship 9
and pointed out that such protection was not limited to family
relationships legitimized by marriage.'0°
The Court acknowledged that Illinois' interests' 0 1 were
approach ... the precise holding was phrased solely in equal protection terms." Comment,
Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, supra note 23, at 101-02 n.43. The dissent also
chastised the majority for the due process aspects of its analysis since Stanley had relied
only on the equal protection clause in his challenge. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 661 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Second, it was unclear whether the due process rights implicated in
Stanley, if any, were procedural or substantive, See Comment, Extending the Rights of
Unwed Fathers, supra note 23, at 100.
92 The fourteenth amendment provides that "No State shall... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
9' Under Illinois law at that time, the type of hearing that Stanley was denied was
granted to both mothers and fathers of legitimate children and to mothers of illegitimate
children. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 649.
11 Because the opinion tended to focus on the type of hearing to which Stanley was
entitled-one determining his parental fitness or unfitness-the author believes that the
Stanley analysis was primarily grounded in procedural due process. See id, at 657-59.
Id. at 651.
97 Id.
9 "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.' " Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S, 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurther,
J., concurring)).
19 Id. at 651-52.
' Id.
"I The state's interests asserted were "to protect 'the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community' and to 'strengthen
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
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legitimateca but observed that "the State registers no gain towards
its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of
fit parents."' 13 The Court rejected the state's contention that all
unwed fathers were unfit parents. 0 4 The Court further refused to
accept the assertion that unwed fathers so seldom make fit parents
that the state's interest in administrative convenience justified its
failure to inquire into an unwed father's fitness as a parent.105
Thus, Stanley was entitled, under the due process and equal
protection clauses, to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
his children could be removed from his custody. 1 6
The next case dealing with the rights of unwed fathers to
reach the Court was Quilloin v. Walcott. 07 While Stanley was
concerned with the rights of unwed fathers in dependency pro-
ceedings, 08 Quilloin dealt with the constitutionality of an adoption
statute.2 9 In Quilloin, the unwed father attempted to block the
adoption of his child by the mother's husband.110
The facts of the case revealed that Quilloin had a far less
substantial relationship with his child than had Stanley."' Quilloin
and the unwed mother, Walcott, "never married each other or
established a home together."" 2 Walcott married a third party
less than three years after the child was born. Quilloin provided
only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately
safeguarded without removal.' " Id. at 652 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT., c. 37, § 701-02).
102 Id.
I03 Id.
1' "We are not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that an
illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a proper upbringing
than one reared by his natural father who was at one time married to his mother ..
Id. at 654 n.7.
,01 In response to this argument, the Court noted that "the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency." Id. at 657 (footnote omitted). The Court went
on to state that "[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individu-
alized determination." Id. at 656-57.
10 Id. at 658.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
106 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647-48.
'0' The statute challenged in Quilloin operated as an exception to the general rule that
the consent of both parents was required before an adoption could proceed. The statute,
GA. CoDE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975), provided that "if the child be illegitimate, the consent
of the mother alone shall suffice." Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249 n.3.
110 Id. at 247.
M Compare id. at 249-52 with Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-56.
112 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
support for the child "only on an irregular basis.""' Walcott had
concluded that Quilloin's visits with the child were "having a
disruptive effect on the child.""14 The child wanted to be adopted
by Walcott's husband. Over a period of eleven years, Quilloin
had not attempted to legitimize the child. 115 When he tried to
block the adoption, Quilloin "did not seek custody or object to
the child's continuing to live with [Walcott and her husband].""16
Under Georgia law,"7 "only the consent of the mother is
required for the adoption of an illegitimate child."" 8 The Georgia
trial court found that the child's adoption by Walcott's husband
was in the "best interests of [the] child'"' 9 and that, because
Quilloin had not legitimized the child, he could not object to the
adoption.2' There was no finding that Quilloin was an unfit
parent.' 2' When his appeal reached the Supreme Court, he argued,
relying on Stanley"-2 "that he was entitled as a matter of due
process and equal protection to an absolute veto over adoption
of his child, absent a finding of his unfitness as a parent."''
The Court rejected Quilloin's claim.'2 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Justice Marshall noted first that there was no claim
that Quilloin had not received notice or an opportunity to be
heard prior to the adoption decree.'25 Justice Marshall framed the
issue as being "whether, in the circumstances of this case and in
light of the authority granted by Georgia law to married fathers,
[Quilloin's] interests were adequately protected by a 'best interest
of the child' standard."'1 The Court then proceeded to examine
both the due process and the equal protection claims. 27
"I Id. at 251.
11 Id.
HI Id. at 249.
116 Id. at 247.
"7 See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975).
HI Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248.
"9 Id. at 251.
12 Id.
"I Id. at 247.
121 Id. at 252-54.
'W Id. at 253. Quiloin "focused his equal protection claim solely on the disparate
treatment of his case and that of a married father." Id.
"A Id. at 256.
121 Id. at 253.
'12 Id. at 254.
127 Id.
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The Court first found that there was no due process violation'8
but declined to rest the decision on Quifloin's failure to legitimize
the child.'2 Instead, the Court seemed to rest its decision on
Quiloin's irresponsibility and minimal involvement in the child's
life and the fact that the adoption would not break up an existing
family unit.'30
QuiUoin's equal protection challenge was based on the fact
that Georgia law permitted a separated or a divorced father to
veto the adoption of his children.' 3' The Court held that there
was no equal protection violation, because Quilloin's interests
were distinguishable from those of separated or divorced fa-
thers. 32 Unlike a formerly married father, Qulloin "never exer-
cised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.' 3 3 Con-
sequently, Quilloin's constitutional rights were not violated by his
having been denied the absolute veto authority over the adoption
of his child. 34
The Court next addressed the.rights of unwed fathers in the
adoption context in Caban v. Mohammed. 35 Abdiel Caban and
Maria Mohammed lived in a nonmarital relationship for slightly
more than five years.' 36 The relationship produced two children.
's Id. at 255.
" Id. at 254.
" We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[if
a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfit-
ness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's
best interests." But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time
had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in
which the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents
with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption
in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence,
a result desired by all concerned except [Quilloin].
Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
" d.
I d.
"' 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
"3 Id. at 382.
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Caban contributed to the support of the children, was listed as
the father on their birth certificates, and lived with them as their
father until Mohammed left Caban-taking the children with
her-to enter into a relationship with a third party, whom she
married approximately one month later. For the next nine months
Caban saw the children once a week when they visited Mo-
hammed's mother. 137
Mohammed's mother took the children to Puerto Rico. 3 1
Fourteen months later Caban went to Puerto Rico himself to visit
the children. 39 The grandmother "willingly surrendered the chil-
dren to Caban with the understanding that they would be returned
after a few days.' 140 Instead of returning the children, however,
Caban returned to New York with them. On learning of this,
Mohammed instituted proceedings to regain custody of the chil-
dren, and the New York Family Court granted her temporary
custody and gave Caban and his new wife visitation rights.' 4'
Two months later, Mohammed and her new husband peti-
tioned for adoption of the children. 142 The Cabans cross-petitioned
for adoption. A hearing was held, and the Mohammed's petition
was granted. Under New York law, only the mother's consent
was required for the adoption of an illegitimate child. 43 Thus,
under the applicable statute, 44 Mohammed was able to block
Caban's petition for adoption by withholding her consent, but
137 Id.
138 Id.
"39 Id. at 383.
I Id.
1I4 Id.
142 Id. The adoption petition was jointly filed by Mohammed and her new husband.
Id.
d 3 The statute in question, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § IIl (McKinney 1975), provided,
in pertinent part: "Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall
be required as follows: ... 3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born
out of wedlock .... ." Caban, 441 U.S. at 385-86 n.4.
" Absent one of these circumstances [where the statute makes parental con-
sent unnecessary], an unwed mother has the authority under New York law
to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding consent. The unwed
father has no similar control over the fate of his child, even when his
parental relationship is substantial-as in this case. He may prevent the
termination of his parental rights only by showing that the best interests of
the child would not permit the child's adoption by the petitioning couple.
Id. at 385-87.
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Caban could not similarly block her petition. 45 Caban could block
Mohammed's petition only by showing that the best interests of
the children would not be served by allowing adoption by the
Mohammeds.'4
On appeal to the Supreme Court, 47 Caban argued that the
New York statute was violative of both the due process and the
equal protection clauses.18 The Court declined to reach the due
process claim 149 and rested its decision on the equal protection
clause.'50 After subjecting the statutes to "intermediate scru-
tiny,'' the Court invalidated the statute as it applied to Cabafi.
The Court rejected the contention "that the broad, gender-based
distinction [in the New York statute] is required by any universal
difference between maternal and paternal relations, at every phase
of a child's development."' 5 2 Furthermore, the Court rejected the
statutory distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers
because the statute did "not bear a substantial relation to the
State's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate
children."' 53
Important to the Court's decision were the facts that the
children were older, 15 4 that no difficulty in locating or identifying
,,1 Id. at 388.
1' Id.
'14 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Two dissenting opinions were submitted: one by Justice Stewart,
the other by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
148 [A]ppellant presses two claims. First, he argues that the distinction drawn
under New York law between the adoption rights of an unwed father and
those of other parents violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, appellant contends that this Court's decision in Quilloin
*,. recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental
relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 394 n.16.
Id. at 388-94.
" The Court considered the relevant statutory classification to create an "undiffer-
entiated distinction" between unwed mothers and unwed fathers. Id. at 394. Gender-based
classifications are subjected to intermediate scrutiny when challenged under the equal
protection clause; such classifications must serve an important "governmental objective"
and be "substantially related" to the achievement of that objective. See generally Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
Id. at 391.
114 Id. at 392.
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the father existed, 55 and that Caban had "established a substantial
relationship"' 15 6 with his children and had "admitted his pater-
nity."'15 7 Thus, the New York statute denying unwed fathers the
right to block the adoption of their children by withholding
consent, while granting such a right to unwed mothers, violated
the equal protection clause. 58
On the same day the Court handed down its ruling in Caban,
it also announced its decision in Parham v. Hughes. 59 In Par-
ham, 60 an unwed father challenged the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute that allowed unwed mothers to sue for the wrong-
ful death of their children but did not grant unwed fathers the
same right.' 6' An unwed father who had legitimized his child
could bring such an action if there were no mother, but one who
had not legitimized his child was precluded from bringing an
action. 162 Parham had not legitimized his child and challenged the
statute under the due process and the equal protection clauses. 6 1
Writing for a plurality of the Court, 64 Justice Stewart rejected
Parham's challenge, 165 concluding that the statutes did not "in-
155 Id.
"5 Id. at 393.
'57 Id.
I' Id. at 393-94.
M' 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
160 Id.
"6 The statute at issue, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-1307 (1978) provided:
A mother, or, if no mother, a father, may recover for the homicide of a
child, minor or sui juris, unless said child shall leave a wife, husband or
child. The mother or father shall be entitled to recover the full value of the
life of such child. In suits by the mother the illegitimacy of the child shall
be no bar to a recovery.
Parham, 441 U.S. at 348 n.1 (emphasis added by the Court).
162 Id. at 349.
163 Id.
-6 Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens, all of whom, it should be noted, dissented in Caban, which was handed down
the same day. The swing vote, not surprisingly, came from Justice Powell, who wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Caban.
Justice White submitted a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined.
'1 Parham, 441 U.S. at 359. It is also noteworthy that the Parham plurality concluded
that cases examining the validity of illegitimacy-based classification were not applicable
because the challenged "statute [did] not impose differing burdens or award differing
benefits to legitimate and illegitimate children." Id. at 354. Decisions striking down
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vidiously discriminate against the appellant simply because he is
of the male sex."'16 The rationale for this conclusion was that
"mother[s] and father[s] of illegitimate children are not similarly
situated"' 67 because "[u]nlike the mother of an illegitimate child
whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father
will frequently be unknown."'" The plurality applied the defer-
ential "rational-basis test' 1 69 and concluded that the statutory
distinction between unwed fathers who had legitimized their chil-
dren and those who had not bore a rational relationship to the
permissible state objective of avoiding fraudulent claims of pater-
nity in an effort to prevent spurious claims against the intestate
estate of illegitimate children. 170
The plurality quickly disposed of the due process challenge,
finding that the appellant's reliance on Stanley was misplaced
because
The interests which the Court found controlling in Stanley were
the integrity of the family against state interference and the
freedom of a father to raise his own children. The present case
is quite a different one, involving as it does only an asserted
right to sue for money damages.' 7'
classifications based on illegitimacy usually reason that such statutes tend to place a burden
upon the illegitimate person by virtue of his status as such and that this is unjust because
an illegitimate person is not responsible for that status. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769-72 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
But see, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274-76 (1978); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
504-08 (1976). See generally Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 IhcH. L.
Ray. 477 (1967). For a helpful examination of the status that illegitimate persons enjoy
under the law, see H. KRAUsE, ILiEGrimAcy: LAw AND SociAs. Poucy 1-105 (1971).
166 Parham, 441 U.S. at 355.
16 Id.
1' Id.
169 The rational basis test, traditionally applied to determine the validity of economic
legislative classifications, requires a statute to serve a "permissible" state objective and be
"rationally related" to the achievement of that objective. See generally McDonald v. Board
of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). The rational basis test has been criticized as being little more
than a rubber stamp validating legislative enactments. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HAnv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). Justice Marshall has opined that the entire three-tier
approach to equal protection analysis should be abandoned. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270 Parham, 441 U.S. at 356-57.
"I Id. at 358-59.
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment 72 and supplied the
fifth vote to uphold the Georgia statute. He felt that the statute
did discriminate on the basis of gender, but nonetheless found
that the classification passed muster under the intermediate scru-
tiny standard. 173 In Justice Powell's view, the statute's distinctions
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers bore a substantial
relationship to the important state interest of "avoiding difficult
problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate
child." 174
The most recent case in which the Court has addressed unwed
fathers' rights is Lehr v. Robertson. 75 According to the majority's
statement of the facts,' 76 Mr. Lehr lived with Ms. Robertson in a
nonmarital relationship. 77 Robertson became pregnant, and Lehr
visited her in the hospital when the child was born.178 Lehr did
not live with Robertson after the child's birth. He never provided
financial support to either Robertson or the child, and he never
offered to marry Robertson. 79 Lehr's name did not appear on
the child's birth certificate, and he never entered his name in the
state's "putative father registry."180
Eight months after the child's birth, Robertson married an-
other man.'' Approximately one and one-half years later, Rob-
ertson's new spouse sought to adopt the child by filing an adoption
petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York.8 2 One
,,2 Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
"I Id. at 359-60.
174 Id.
'-' 463 U.S. 248 (1982). Lehr is perhaps the most interesting and disturbing of the
Stanley line of cases, because, as one commentator has put it, "[r]eading the dissent is
like reading a different case." Doskow, supra note 3, at 24.
116 But compare Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-53 (facts as stated by the majority) with id.
at 268-71 (White, J., dissenting) (facts as stated by the dissent).
1" Id. at 253. The parties cohabitated for approximately two years prior to the child's
birth. See id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting).
,71 Id. at 252.
179 Id.
10 Id. at 251. The registry was provided for under N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 372-C
(McKinney Supp. 1983). It was used to record the names and the addresses of persons
who intended to claim paternity of an illegitimate 'child. Persons who had signed the
registry were one of seven classes of putative fathers who were entitled to notice of
adoption proceedings regarding their children. See N.Y. DoM. Re. LAW § 111-l(2)(c)
(McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-83), set forth at infra note 289.
8I Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251.
182 Id.
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month after the adoption proceeding was commenced, Lehr filed
a petition in the Westchester County Family Court, asking for a
determination of paternity, an order of support, and visitation
privileges. 183 The Ulster County judge, though fully aware of the
proceeding commenced by Lehr, granted the Robertsons' petition
for adoption, 184 without giving Lehr notice of, or an opportunity
to be heard in, the adoption proceeding. 85 Under New York law,
Lehr was not entitled to notice or to an opportunity to be heard
unless he had signed the putative father registry.'86
Lehr argued that the New York statutory scheme violated the
Constitution in two respects:
First, he contend[ed] that a putative father's actual or potential
relationship with a child born out of wedlock is an interest in
liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of law;
he argu[ed] therefore that he had a constitutional right to prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was deprived
of that interest. Second, he contend[ed] that the gender-based
classification in the statute, which both denied him the right to
consent to [his child's] adoption and accorded him fewer pro-
cedural rights than [the child's] mother, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'8
The Court rejected both of Lehr's claims. 88 The Court'8 9 held
that "the mere existence of a biological link"' 90 between an unwed
father and his child does not merit constitutional due process
protection until and unless the unwed father "demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child.' "9' If an unwed
father takes such action, "his interest in personal contact with his
" Id. at 252.
18 Id. at 252-53.
"' Id.
" See supra note 180.
Id. at 255 (footnote omitted).
"' Id. at 263-65, 268-69.
" Joining Justice Steven's opinion were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Curiously, Justice Brennan also joined the majority opinion.
Justice White authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined.
1 Id. at 261.
19, Id. (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
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child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause.' 192 The majority believed that Lehr's failure to sign the
putative father registry was a sufficient reason for the state to
deny Lehr notice of and opportunity to be heard at the adoption
proceeding. 193 In effect, Lehr's failure to sign the registry meant
that he had not "earned" his right to receive notice.'1 The New
York statute, therefore, did not violate the due process clause. 95
The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim, holding
that Lehr and Robertson were not similarly situated in their
respective relationships with their child.19 In contrast to Robert-
son, Lehr had never " 'come forward to participate in the rearing
of his child' "197 and had "never established any custodial, per-
sonal, or financial relationship with [his child]."' 98 The Court
explicitly stated that "[i]f one parent has an established custodial
relationship with the child and the other parent has either aban-
doned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents
different legal rights."' 99 The New York statute therefore did not
violate Lehr's rights under the equal protection clause.2
B. The Right to Know in the Context of Stanley and Its Progeny
None of the Stanley line of cases necessarily decided the
question of whether the Constitution protects the unwed father's
right to know. In each case, the unwed father knew of his child's
existence.201 In addition, the children involved were not infants. 20
192 Id.
"I Id. at 264.
194 See Doskow, supra note 3, at 23.
9 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-65.
196 Id. at 267-68.
'7 Id. at 267 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
'19 Id. at 267.
'99 Id. at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).
2W Id.
201 In Stanley, the unwed father had been living with the children until the time when
they were removed from his custody. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. In Quilloin, the very
fact that Leon Quilloin attempted to block his child's adoption evidences his knowledge
of the child's existence. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. In Parham, the unwed father's
knowledge of the child is shown by his signing the child's birth certificate. See Parham,
441 U.S. at 349. In Caban, the unwed father's contact and relationship with his children
were substantial. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-84. Finally, in Lehr, the father's knowledge
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The right to know was, in each case, well past the temporal point
when its protection is most critical.2z  Indeed, in each case, the
unwed father in question knew of his paternity when the child
was born.
Furthermore, the cases cannot be easily analogized to a case
in which the right to know is in dispute. The question of whether
the right to know is constitutionally protected is essentially a
question of whether some form of "notice" of paternity is re-
quired by the Constitution. 2°s Only Lehr presented the question
of whether the unwed father was entitled to some form of no-
tice.Y The notice question in Lehr, however, concerned whether
the unwed father was constitutionally entitled, in all cases, to
notice that his child was the subject of adoption proceedings.
The private and the state interests pertinent to an unwed father's
right to notice of his child's adoption? are not coextensive with
of his child's existence is seen from Lehr's visits to the child, his efforts to seek a declaration
of paternity, and his attempt to block the child's adoption. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-53.
See supra note 25 for an explanation of this Note's use of the term "infant." The
facts in Stanley do not indicate the ages of Peter Stanley's children; however, the Court's
description of his interest as being "that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,"
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added), implies that the children were at least beyond
the age of newborns. In Quilloin, the child was approximately 12 years old when Randall
Walcott first sought adoption of the child. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. The child in Parham
was dead, and, therefore, was not "involved" in the case; his or her age at death is
somewhat irrelevant to the present discussion. Parham, 441 U.S. at 349. Caban's children
were ages 6 and 4 respectively when the Mohammeds filed their adoption petition. Caban
441 U.S. at 382-83. Lehr's child was more than 2 years of age when the Robertsons sought
to adopt her. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250, 252.
2 See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
"I In Stanley, Caban, and Lehr, the respective unwed fathers were living with the
respective unwed mothers at the time (or shortly before) the births of the children in
question. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252; Caban, 441 U.S. at 382; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
In Quilloin and Parham, the unwed fathers consented to the entry of their names on their
children's birth certificates. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249 n.6; Parham, 441 U.S. at 349.
"I In the right to know's purest form, the duty to give notice arises at the birth of
the child. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. For a representative sample of
cases discussing whether and to what extent the Constitution requires notice in other
contexts, see Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1981) (pendency of action); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949) (in rem proceeding); Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (action against non-residents); -McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90 (1917) (lack of service of process).
463 U.S. 248, 255; see supra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
Id. at 255.
See id. at 256-68.
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the interests implicated when the issue concerns an unwed father's
right to notice of his child's existence3 °9
The cases, at least until Lehr,210 while not necessitating the
conclusion that the right to know is constitutionally protected, 21'
add support to-or at least are not inconsistent with-such a
contention. In Stanley, the Court noted that "offering unwed
fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness"
would impose only minimal cost on the state.212 Further, the Court
stated, "[i]f unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the
disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand
hearings. "213
The Stanley Court seemed to indicate that affording every
unwed father whose parental rights were about to be terminated
an opportunity to be heard would impose such a minimal burden
on the state that a state's failure to provide the opportunity was
constitutionally impermissible. 21 4 In contrast, protecting the right
to know, involving as it does only the right to receive notice of
one's child's existence-and not a corresponding right to be
heard,2 5 would seem to impose even less administrative burden
21 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text; infra notes 310-426 and accompa-
nying text.
210 But see infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
212 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 657-58.
215 Some might object that the right to know-even if protected-is of little practical
value if an accompanying right to be heard on at least some matter does not exist. Perhaps
this is true; perhaps not. Certainly in cases in which the principal concern is with informing
the unwed father of the child's existence prior to the child's adoption-the scenario which
is the reference point of this Note-the right to know probably would carry with it a right
to be heard on matters pertaining to the adoption. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying
text. On the other hand, however, the right to know, in its purest form, would extend to
cases in which the mother keeps the child and in which there is no stepparent seeking to
adopt the child. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. The question of whether
and to what extent the right to know should be protected and the question of whether
and to what extent unwed fathers should be provided with an opportunity to be heard are
not necessarily bound together inextricably. Different considerations may be involved in
each, and an examination of whether and to what extent an opportunity to be heard
should accompany protection of the right to know is beyond the scope of this Note. For
cases discussing whether and to what extent the Constitution requires that an opportunity
to be heard be provided in other contexts, see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (wage garnishment proceeding); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
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on the state,2 6 at least if the father's identity and location are
known or are readily ascertainable. 2 7 Thus, if an unwed father
has any constitutionally protected parental interest-solely by vir-
tue of the biological relationship-the Constitution should require
that his right to know also be protected. The primary question,
not addressed in Stanley, is whether such an interest exists. 21 8
Quilloin, in contrast, provides little guidance on whether the
right to know is constitutionally protected. The most that can be
said of Quilloin is that its rationale and its holding are not
inconsistent with the contention that the right to know is protected
by the Constitution.21 9 Quilloin's challenge of the Georgia law
failed because he had failed to take advantage of the opportunity
to develop a substantial relationship with his child.2'- He would
never even have had such an opportunity, of course, had he not
known of his child's existence.mn
Similarly, Parham offers little help in determining whether or
not the Constitution protects the right to know. 22 13 As in
416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (hearing
on prejudgment writ of replevin); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(prejudgment hearing on garnishment of wages).
216 Requiring a state to provide notice but not to provide a hearing is less burdensome
than requiring the state to provide both.
2" Somewhat different considerations seem to be involved if the unwed father's
identity or location cannot readily be determined, with a positive correlation between the
degree of difficulty in making such a determination and the burden that the state must
bear. Cf. Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 n.ll (leaving open the question of whether a state might
be able to impose more stringent standards concerning the acknowledgment of paternity
in cases in which the identity of the father is more difficult to ascertain, such as when the
child is an infant).
218 Stanley's interest appears to have risen to the level of being constitutionally
protected by virtue of his fatherhood and his substantial relationship with the children.
See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62 (distinguishing Stanley).
219 The Court did not need to address the issue of whether the biological relationship
in and of itself could suffice to give an unwed father a constitutionally protected interest
in a relationship with his child, for even if such an interest exists, Quilloin's failure to
develop such a relationship operated as a waiver of whatever rights he might otherwise
have had. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254-56.
m See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975).
21 See supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
2 If Quilloin had not known of his child's existence, then his argument would have
been that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected opportunity to develop a rela-
tionship with his child. This argument is clearly different from the one he advanced; the
question of whether it is a better one is what this section of the Note is trying to determine.
"3 The issue in Parham-whether an unwed father could be deprived of the privilege
of suing for the wrongful death of his child when such a privilege is granted to an unwed
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Quilloin, 2 " the Parham plurality rested its decision, m large part,
on the unwed father's failure to take action that would have rendered
his relationship to his child legally more substantial.2 Yet, the
unwed father in Parham would not have had the opportunity to
fail if he had not known of his child's existence. Justice Powell's
concurrence, resting as it did on the difficulty of proving the
paternity of the father of a deceased child,2 also is of little use.
The right to know, it will be remembered, is discussed here only
in the context of cases in which the father's identity is known or
is readily ascertainable.
Caban is somewhat more helpful to the analysis. It is like the
previously discussed cases in that Caban's substantial relationship
with his children was a critical factor in the Court's decision.2 7
However, he would not have had the opportunity to develop this
relationship if he had not known of his children's existenceY5s
The Court offered guidance to the analysis late in the opinion
when the Court discussed the decision in In re Malptca-Orsinj 9
In In re Malpica-Orsini, the New York Court of Appeals held
that it was not necessary to obtain an unwed father's consent to
the adoption of his child, even though an unwed mother's consent
was required . 0 The decision rested, in part, on the court's con-
clusion that requinng the unwed father's consent would burden
the adoption procedure because of the difficulty in locating him
when adoption proceedings are brought.Y The unwed mother, in
mother-is sufficiently different from the issue presented in the other unwed fathers' rights
cases that some commentators have not listed Parham as being in the Stanley line of cases.
See, e.g., Comment, Removing the Bar Sinister, supra note 23, at 506-07; Note, Putative
Fathers, supra note 23, at 429-30; Note, Adoption, supra note 23, at 926. Such judgments
are quite legitimate. Parham bears little relevance to most issues concernng unwed fathers'
parental rights. Parham, however, has been included in this Note's discussion because it
provides at least some mmmal guidance on how the Supreme Court has viewed claims by
unwed fathers.
21 Cf. supra note 222.
21 In particular, Curtis Parham failed to take action to legitimatize the child. See
Parham, 441 U.S. at 353-56.
216 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
- Cf. supra note 222.
331 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y. 1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Orsim v. Blasi, 423 U.S.
1042 (1976).
2" See id. at 513.
231 See Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 (discussing the reasorung mn Malpica-Orsini).
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contrast, is less difficult to locate because she is more likely to
remain with the child. 32
The Supreme Court rejected the New York court's rationale
in In re Malpica-Orsini when it struck down the New York
statutory scheme in Caban.231 The Court stated that such diffi-
culties were not present in Caban's caseY 4 If the Court had left
it at that, the contention that the right to know is constitutionally
protected would have been buttressed233 -when the unwed father
is not difficult to locate prior to the adoption, 2 6 a state, under
the Court's reasoning, appears to be constitutionally compelled
to protect the right to know237 by informing the father of the
child's existence. 238
However, the difficulties mentioned in In re Malpica-Orsini
were not present in Caban's case because Caban's children were
no longer infants. 239 The Court stated: "[e]ven if the special
difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying unwed fathers
at birth would justify a legislative distinction between mothers
and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not persist past
2 Id.
21 Caban, 441 U.S. at 395. Caban operated to overrule the New York Court of
Appeal's decision in In re Malpica-Orsini, which involved the same statute that was struck
down in Caban.
1- Id. at 393.
"I, But see infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
I6 The focus of the discussion in this Note is on cases in which the unwed fathers'
identity is at least known to the unwed mother. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying
text.
n, The contrary argument is that the problem in Caban was that unwed mothers had
been statutorily granted the right to block the adoption of their children, while such a
right was denied to unwed fathers. See id. at 392-94. In right to know cases, in contrast,
the protection of the unwed mothers' "right to know" comes not from statute, but rather
from nature; therefore, no statutory classification is responsible for the alleged inequality.
This, in effect, is a variation of the "not similarly situated in fact" rationale, adopted by
many courts that have refused to find classifications based on pregnancy to be impermissible
gender discrimination under Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2002e (1964). See Geduldig v. Aieilo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Title
VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 so as to include employers'
classification on the basis of pregnancy within the proscriptions of Title VII, thus over-
turning Gilbert and Satty. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978).
23 Such a requirement would presumably arise from the equal protection clause-the
basis upon which Caban rested its decision. See supra note 89 for the text of the equal
protection clause.
"I See Caban, 441 U.S. at 392.
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infancy.' ' Further, the Court stated that "[b]ecause the question
is not before us, we express no view whether such difficulties
would justify a statute addressed particularly to newborn adop-
tions .... 24
Thus, on the one hand, the Court's reasoning lends support
to the proposition that the right to know might be constitutionally
protected in cases in which there is no special difficulty in locating
the unwed father of an infant.242 If an unwed father has any
constitutional interest in an infant of whom the father is un-
aware, 24 the state would suffer no greater burden in informing
him of the child's adoption if the father's identity is known than
it would in informing the unwed father of a non-infant of the
child's adoption, if his identity is known, 244 an obligation man-
dated by Caban245 Therefore, if the unwed father's identity is
known or is readily ascertainable, the Constitution might protect
the right to know to the extent that the state must inform the
father of the adoption of his infant child, of whom the father
has no knowledge.3
The Court's caveat,247 however, precludes one from making
this assertion with confidence. In very clear terms, the Court left
open the possibility that a state may constitutionally elect not to
inform an unwed father of his newborn child's adoption-even
if there is no question as to the father's identity or location.2
As in Stanley,249 a critical question with regard to the right to
know is left open.
Lehri- 0 is arguably the most useful case in ascertaining whether
the Constitution protects the right to know. It could easily be
read to have answered the question left open in Stanley. 21 The
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4' Id. at 392 n.11.
142 See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
2' This was the question identified as having been left open in Stanley. See supra
notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
24 See Caban, 441 U.S. at 392-94.
24 But see supra note 238.
24 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
m See supra text accompanying note 241.
24 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
m Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248.
25 But see infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
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Court, in ruling against Lehr, held that because Lehr had not
taken advantage of the opportunity to develop a substantial re-
lationship with his child, he had no constitutionally protected
interest in that relationship.2 2 Similarly, if an unwed father's right
to know has not been protected, by definition, he has not devel-
oped a substantial relationship with his child. Lehr could be read
to say that an unwed father has no constitutionally protected
interest in the child, which would foreclose the assertion that the
right to know is protected by the Constitution. 253
Lehr, however, might not preclude such a contention. The
critical difference between the facts in Lehr and in cases in which
the right to know has not been protected is that in the latter, the
unwed father is not only foreclosed from objecting to his child's
adoption, but he is also precluded from learning of his child's
existence. In other words, while Lehr may have decided that an
unwed father's failure to take advantage of an opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child removed him from the Con-
stitution's protection with respect to that relationship, 25 4 Lehr did
not necessarily decide whether an-unwed father could be deprived
of that opportunity in the first placeY 5 It is not inconsistent with
Lehr, therefore, to maintain that the Constitution requires that
the right to know be protected when the child is surrendered for
adoption256 and the father's identity and location are known or
readily ascertainable . 57
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-65.
2,3 It would be more correct-considering the holdings in Stanley and Caban-to say
that Lehr could be read as saying that an unwed father, by virtue of his status as such,
without more, does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child. Even if this is true, however, this does not negate
the possibility that an unwed father might have further constitutional rights with respect
to his relationship with his child than those that have thus far been identified, and that
some of these rights might not have a "right to know" component to them. Adoption
rights provide the best example of such rights.
2-4 See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
"I Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-63.
2-6 Although under this view, it would not be inconsistent with Lehr to contend that
an unwed father has a right to know of his child's existence even if the child has not been
surrendered for adoption, it would read far too much into Lehr, and the previous cases,
to suggest that they support such an assertion.
11 This qualification is advisable because of the question left open in Caban. See
supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
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This conclusion gathers further support from the Court's
statement that
[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses
to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitu-
tion will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion
of where the child's best interests lie.28
It is curious that this statement discusses the "significance of
the biological connection,"'219 when earlier in the opinion the
Court stated "the mere existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional protection."'' ° On the basis of the
earlier statement, Lehr has been read by some to hold that the
mere biological connection between an unwed father and his child
is not constitutionally protected at all.'61 Such an interpretation
seems to be a flat misreading of Lehr, because it ignores the
crucial word "equivalent" in the Court's statement.
What the Court actually said was that the Constitution extends
greater protection to unwed fathers who have the "biological
link" and have developed substantial relationships with their chil-
dren than to unwed fathers who have only the "biological link." 262
The Court did not say that-unwed fathers of the latter type have
no constitutionally protected interest in the relationship with their
children. 26 13 Moreover, if the statement in question was interpreted
to mean that such a biological link is accorded no protection
under the Constitution, this would be inconsistent with the state-
ments discussing "the significance of the biological connection.'2 4
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (footnotes omitted).
259 Id.
21 Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
261 See, e.g., Raab, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much
Process Is Due?, 7 HAiv. WOMEN L.J. 265, 268 (1984) ("Justice Stevens' analysis was
shaped by the explicit presumption that the biological tie between the unwed father and
his child does not in itself create a constitutionally protected interest." (footnote omitted)).
See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 n.18.
20 Id. at 262.
Id. (emphasis added).
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When one considers that the two statements are on the same page
of the opinion, the better view is that Lehr implies that the
existence of a biological connection does give rise to a constitu-
tionally protected interest, albeit less substantial than it would be
if there were also a developed relationship between the unwed
father and the child.25 The pertinent question remaining after
Lehr, therefore, concerns the extent to which the Constitution
provides protection to "a mere biological link."
The question whether the Constitution accords some protec-
tion to the right to know thus remains open. Using the Court's
prior decisions as guidelines, two arguments support such an
assertion. The first is that failure to protect the right to know is
violative of the equal protection clause.2 Absent such protection,
an impermissible gender-based classification exists that provides
the unwed mother with an opportunity to develop a meaningful
relationship with the child, while the father is denied the oppor-
tunity. However, Lehr shows that the Court may be hesitant to
find an equal protection violation when the pertinent classification
distinguishes between unwed mothers and unwed fathers. 267
The better argument that supports the recognition of a con-
stitutionally protected right to know is based on the due process
clause. The opportunity to develop a relationship with one's child,
even if one is an unmarried male, might well be a liberty interest
of which one cannot be deprived without due process of law.3
Resolution of precisely what process is due would depend on the
facts of each particular case, but a state could not fail to inform
an unwed father of his child's existence in the absence of unusual
circumstances.2 9
III. THm UNWED FATHER AND STATE LAW
A. Historical Treatment of Unwed Fathers
The previous section examined whether and to what extent
unwed fathers are protected by the Constitution. This section
"Id.
See Caban, 441 U.S. 388-94; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658-59.
"6 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 214-18, 220-22, 225, 242-60 and accompanying text.
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briefly examines the protection accorded to unwed fathers under
state statutes. 270 A detailed examination of the intricacies of the
statutory schemes of each individual state would prove to be
cumbersome, cumulative, and of little use, because no state has
enacted legislation aimed specifically at protecting the right to
know.271 Therefore, only general statutory themes relevant to the
right to know are discussed.
Historically, states did not acknowledge the existence of pa-
rental rights of unwed fathers. 272 Statutory definitions of "par-
ent," while including both the mother and the father of legitimate
children, included only mothers as the parents of illegitimate
children. 273 Notwithstanding the fact that such statutes were con-
stitutionally defective, 274 their ramifications on the right to know
are obvious: an unwed father would have no right to know of
his child's existence if the law did not even acknowledge his
paternity. 275
B. Modern Treatment of Unwed Fathers
In modern times, some states, while statutorily recognizing
unwed fathers as "parents," nevertheless extend few, if any,
270 Rather than citing to the statutory language, most of which is multi-sectional,
lengthy, and somewhat complex, most references in this section are to state cases which
have construed their respective state statutes.
271 Some statutes, such as those providing that an unwed father's consent must be
obtained before the adoption of his child may proceed, inadvertently protect the right to
know.
m This lack of recognition probably derived from two traditional-and usually un-
questioned-assumptions: (1) that an unwed mother had a prima facie right to the custody
of her child; and (2) that the majority of unwed fathers had no interest in recognizing,
supporting, legitimizing, or rearing their children. See Comment, Removing the Bar Sinister,
supra note 23, at 502; see also In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 129-31 (Minn. 1965);
Note, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. REa. 85, 89 (1980);
Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights, supra note 1, at 115. See generally
Tabler, supra note 7, at 245-50.
273 An illustrative example is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-14urd 1972),
which defines "parent" as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor
of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parents."
(emphasis added).
- Such statutes are invalidated by the decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). See Note, Putative Fathers, supra note 23, at 427 n.14.
21 After research into the statutes of the several states, the author has not found any
state that continues to entirely exclude unwed fathers from their statutory definition of
"parent."
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substantive parental rights to them.276 In the adoption context,
for example, if an unwed father happens to learn that his child
has been surrendered for adoption, 277 he may appear at the pro-
ceeding to provide testimony concerning the best interests of the
child. 278 His testimony is given no greater weight than any other
"stranger" 279 to the proceeding,2 0 and is often given less weight
than testimony by strangers.2 1
Still other states provide for notice to an unwed father of the
impending adoption of his child.m Sometimes the father is granted
an opportunity to be heard at the adoption proceeding.23 Varying
degrees of weight are given to the father's testimony.3 4 Some of
the states that purport to protect the unwed father by requiring
that notice of his child's adoption be given to him, however,
exempt certain cases from this requirement, such as when the
"I See infra note 278 and sources cited therein.
" This discovery might come about by judicial notice, by the mother's statements,
or by inadvertence. See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of
judicial notice.
m See, e.g., In re Application of Byron N. Ashinore, 293 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. App.
1982) (construing GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406(c) (1977) to give an unwed father the right to
file objections to a proposed adoption provided he takes certain steps toward legitimizing
child); Adoption of B. v. E.B., 378 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1977) (construing N.J.S.A. 913-17
to give an unwed father the right to object to the proposed adoption of his child and to
present testimony regarding the child's best interests); In re Benjamin, 403 N.Y.S.2d 877,
879-80 (1978) (construing N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a to allow unwed father to present
evidence regarding best interests of proposed adoptee).
2 9 See supra note 57.
21 Often, the report of the adoption agency as to the best interests of the child is
given more weight than the testimony of the unwed father.
"I See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 459-60 (Ga. 1987); Adoption of
G., 529 A.2d 809, 810-11 (Me. 1987); In Re Adoption of R.G.C., 742 P.2d 471, 472
(Mont. 1987).
n See, e.g., Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315, 317 (La. App. 1984), cert. denied, 461
So. 2d 304 (1984); Sadden v. Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 132 (Minn. 1965).
2" See sources cited at supra note 281. But see In re Adoption of R.H.A., 702 P.2d
1259, 1264 (Wyo. 1985).
I" See, e.g., W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864-68 (Cal. App. 1979)
(father's testimony relevant but not to be given dispositive weight); In re Adoption of
Bradley Joel Mullenix, 359 So. 2d 65, 68-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (testimony of father
as to child's best interests considered, but not followed); In re Adoption of Emily Ann,
522 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1987) (father's testimony called "incredible"); In
re Margaret Rose Schwartz, 1985 WL 7416 (Ohio App. 1985) (unpublished opinion)
(father's testimony given decisive weight); In re Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 989-90
(Wyo. 1986) (father's testimony given little weight).
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child is an infant.15 Often, no effort is made to provide notice
of the adoption to the unwed father, when the father's name does
not appear on the birth certificate. 286 Sometimes the notice to the
unwed father is merely constructive-usually by publication-even
in cases in which his identity and location are known or are
readily ascertainable. 287 A few statutory schemes, like the one
upheld in Lehr,21 specify certain classes of fathers who are entitled
to receive notice2s9
Some states purport to require an unwed father's consent
before the adoption of his child will be allowed to proceed. 290
I" See, e.g., In re Laws' Adoption, 20 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (Cal. App. 1962) (when
child is an illegitimate infant, mother can act as father's agent in matters relating to
adoption).
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Carmen Lydia S., 435 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646-47 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1981); In re Adoption of Mindy Lynn Strauser, 1987 WL 14237 (Ohio App. 1987)
(unpublished opinion); In re Adoption of Kristina Marie King, 1985 WL 7902 (Ohio App.
1985) (unpublished opinion).
21 See, e.g., In re Steve B.D. and Linda Sue D., 730 P.2d 942, 944 (Idaho 1986); In
re Adoption of Jessica XX, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983); see supra notes 175-200 and accom-
panying text.
9 The statute at issue in Lehr, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11 1-a(2) (McKinney 1977 &
Supp. 1982-83), specified seven classes of fathers that were entitled to notice. The statute
provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
2. Persons entitled to notice ... shall include:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the
child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state ... to be the
father of the child ... ;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to
daim paternity of the child...;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the
child's father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother
at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to
be the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother
in written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months
subsequent to the birth of the child....
m See, e.g., In re Jones, 340 N.E.2d 269 (1I. 1975); Unwed Mother v. Unwed Father,
379 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); In re Adoption of U., 435 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661-
62 (Family Court 1981); In re Mitchell, 421 N.Y.S.2d 443 (4th Dept. 1979), rev'd, 451
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1982). But see, e.g., In re Dept. of Social Serv., 461 N.E.2d 186, 188-89
(Mass. 1984).
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Once again, certain cases-such as when the child is an infant291
or when the father's name is not on the birth certificate92-are
excluded from this requirement. The concept of waiver, or "con-
structive consent," is often utilized when the father's actual con-
sent appears unlikely to be forthcoming. 293 Moreover, an unwed
father's right to block an adoption by withholding his consent is
seldom, if ever, absolute.2-4 It is quite possible, even common,
for the adoption to proceed in the absence of the father's con-
sent.2 95
Other statutes are relevant to the right to know. Most, if not
all, states provide that an adoption becomes irrevocable after a
certain length of time.2 Even in those states that provide for a
relatively longer period of time during which the adoption order
can be rescinded,297 it is usually only the natural mother who has
29 See, e.g., In re Ice, 342 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. App. 1976); In re Adoption of Doe, 555
P.2d 906, 907-08 (N.M. App. 1976), cert. denied, 558 P.2d 614, and cert. denied, 558
P.2d 619 (N.M. 1976); In re "R" Children, 418 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (Family Court 1979);
In re Orzo, 374 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555-56 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1975); see In re Adoption of A.,
226 A.2d 823, 824 (Del. 1967).
21 See, e.g., Hoskins v. Nichols, 386 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); In re Martin,
357 So. 2d 893 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1301 (La. 1978); In re S., 435
N.Y.S.2d 645 (Surr. Ct. 1981); see Wells v. Childrens' Aid Soc., 681 P.2d 199 (Utah
1984).
29 See, e.g., Hoskins, 386 So. 2d at 1171; In re Adoption of A., 226 A.2d at 825;
In re S., 435 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
" This is also true in the case of unwed mothers. A parent, whether married or
unmarried, can have his or her parental rights terminated with respect to his or her child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-109 (1973 & Supp.
1986). If this occurs, a child's adoption cannot be blocked by the parent's withholding his
or her consent. See, e.g., id. at § 93-17-7.
I" See, e.g., In re P.G. & L.G., 452 A.2d 1183, 1183-84 (D.C. App. 1982); Adoption
of Mullenix, 359 So. 2d at 66-67; Steve B.D. & Linda Sue D., 730 P.2d at 944; MR v.
Meltzer, 487 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. App. 1986); Adoption of R.G.C., 742 P.2d at 472-73;
Adoption of Emily Ann, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 787; In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d
1059, 1061-62 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Harjo v. Duello, 108 S. Ct. 1042
(1988); Adoption of R.H.A., 702 P.2d at 1261-63 (Wyo. 1985). But see In re Application
of S.R.S. & M.B.S. v. M.C.C., 408 N.W.2d 272, 278-79 (Neb. 1987).
21 See, e.g., In re Pillsbury, 166 P. 11, 12 (Cal. 1917); In re Brock, 25 So. 2d 659,
660-61 (Fla. 1946); Wailes v. Curators of Central College, 254 S.W.2d 645, 647-50 (Mo.
1953); Betz v. Horr, 11 N.E.2d 548, 550 (N.Y. 1937); Byrd v. Byrd, 69 N.E.2d 75, 77
(Ohio Ct. App. 1945); Ex parte Moulin, 217 P.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Okla. 1950).
21 The states vary widely in their treatment of an attempt by a natural parent to
withdraw her consent to an adoption. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 909 (1981 &
Supp. 1986) (60 days to withdraw consent); ILL. R y. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1513 (1980 &
Supp. 1987) (1 year to revoke consent if it was obtained by fraud or duress); MD. FAM.
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any chance of obtaining a successful revocation of the adoption
decree.298 Once an adoption order has been handed down, an
unwed father stands little chance of successfully challenging it.299
Furthermore, most, if not all, states provide that records
concerning an adoption become sealed after the adoption order
has been entered.3°° Some states even impose criminal penalties
on anyone who releases information contained in these records
without a court order authorizing such release. 01 In effect, these
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-311(c) (1984 & Supp. 1987) (90 days to revoke consent); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-11 (1984) (18-month limit for revoking consent if no adoption proceeding
instituted in that time); Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.09(B) (Anderson 1980) (consent
revocable prior to entry of interlocutory order or final decree if in best interests of child);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.10 (West 1987) (30 days to revoke consent if in best
interests of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-117(b) (1984 & Supp. 1987) (15 days to
withdraw consent); Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. § 16.06 (Vernon 1986) (consent may be with-
drawn at any time before order granting adoption is entered).
211 Even if this were not provided by statute, the unwed father would be unlikely to
have much chance at success because the records of the adoption would be inaccessible to
him. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
29 There is, of course, no guarantee of success for even an unwed mother's attempt
to invalidate the adoption decree. The standard is usually what would be in the best
interest of the child. See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 288 So. 2d 142, 144 (Ala. App. 1973);
In re Adoption of Holman, 295 P.2d 372, 376 (Ariz. 1956); Lee v. Thomas, 181 S.W.2d
457, 460-61 (Ky. 1944); In re Adoption of Child, 277 A.2d 566, 569-70 (N.J. Super. 1971);
Webb v. Wiley, 600 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Okla. 1979). Other factors, such as the situation of
the proposed adoptive parents, are also taken into consideration. See generally Barwin v.
Reidy, 307 P.2d 175, 184-86 (N.M. 1957).
"I The Kentucky statute is illustrative. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) The files and records of the court during adoption proceedings shall not
be open to inspection by persons other than parties to such proceedings,
their attorneys, and representatives of the cabinet except under order of the
court expressly permitting inspection. Upon the entry of the final order in
the case, the clerk shall place all papers and records in the case in a suitable
envelope which shall not be open for inspection by any person except on
written order of the court. No person having charge of any adoption records
shall disclose the names of any parties appearing in such records or furnish
any copy of any such records, except under order of the court which entered
the judgment of adoption. The clerk of the circuit court shall set up a
separate docket and order book for adoption cases and these files and records
shall be kept locked.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570(1) 0Michie-Bobbs Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1986).
30' Once again, a Kentucky statute is illustrative, providing, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(2) Any person who violates any of the provisions of [the statute cited in
supra note 300], or any rule or regulation under such section the violation
of which is made unlawful shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars
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confidentiality statutes, together with the irrevocability statutes,
require that an unwed father's right to know must be protected
prior to his child's adoption or that right will be forever lost.3°2
Even this cursory examination of state statutory schemes shows
clearly that state protection of unwed fathers' rights is, on the
whole, dismal.30 3 The right to know, in particular, is provided
little or no protection. When some protection is provided, nu-
merous methods of circumventing the protection exist. Conse-
quently, one is thus faced with the question of whether the right
to know should be protected. The following section addresses that
question. 0
IV. Tm RIGHT TO KNow: SHOULD IT BE PROTECTED?
Thus far, this Note principally has been concerned with whether
and to what extent the right to know is presently protected under
both the Constitution30 5 and the state statutes. 306 The focus has
been on the existence of the right to know and its scope under
the law as it presently stands; little attention has been given to
the question of whether and to what extent the right to know
($500) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2000) or imprisoned for not
more than six (6) months, or both. Each day such violation continues shall
constitute a separate offense.
Id. at § 199.990(2).
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
State protection of unwed fathers' rights is, however, much better than it used to
be-even as recently as 1972, when Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), was decided.
As one commentator has observed:
Reading Stanley is something like being in a time warp. It is a matter of
some surprise that as recently as 1972 a state could, without notice or hearing,
deprive a natural father of any right whatsoever to notice or hearing in a
proceeding to cut off all his rights with respect to minor children.
Doskow, supra note 3, at 18. For a discussion of Stanley, see supra notes 81-106 and
accompanying text. The decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), seemed,
unfortunately, to signal a "leveling off" of state protection of unwed fathers' rights. Lehr
is discussed at supra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
- The reader might object that this question should have been addressed before
discussing the status of the right to know under both the Constitution and state law. The
objection is not without merit; however, the author believes that the better approach was
to look into where the right to know stands in fact before discussing where the right
perhaps should stand.
See supra notes 79-269 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 270-304 and accompanying text.
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should be protected. 30 This section focuses on that more funda-
mental question-the answer to which concededly will be more
subjective.3s
A multitude of considerations factor into determining whether
and to what extent the right to know should be protected. These
considerations are of constitutional, 30 9 public policy,310 and
practical"' dimensions, all of which must be weighed and balanced
before a principled decision regarding the right to know can be
made. The remainder of this section will attempt to: (A) identify
the constitutional considerations that are relevant to this decision;
(B) identify the public policy considerations that are relevant to
this decision; and (C) discuss how much weight should be given
to each consideration, and place each consideration on the appro-
priate side of the scale to see which way it balances out.312
A. Constitutional Considerations313
Several constitutional principles appear relevant. One such
principle arises from the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
Y See supra note 304.
The personal inclinations of the author favor some form of protection of the right
to know. Nonetheless, the author has attempted in this section to remain as objective as
possible. Occasionally, the consequence is probably a bit of overcompensation; in certain
cases more deference is given to considerations weighing against protection of the right to
know than is probably warranted, and close questions have been generally resolved in
favor of the argument against protection.
See infra notes 313-57 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 358-88 and accompanying text.
3,, The practicalities involved in protecting the right to know are discussed in Part V
of this Note.
312 See infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text.
33 The term "constitutional consideration," as used in this section, does not mean
that the constitutional provisions discussed mandate protection or nonprotection of the
right to know. The status of the right to know under the Constitution has already been
discussed. See supra notes 201-79 and accompanying text. Instead, "constitutional consid-
eration" refers to those policies which were deemed essential enough by the framers and
jurists so as to warrant their furtherance in the Constitution. In a sense, therefore, they
are merely "public policy" considerations and are in this section, see infra notes 270-304
and accompanying text, only in that they have been elevated, by virtue of their embodiment
in the Constitution, to a somewhat higher status than the latter considerations. Moreover,
it might be argued that the most important "public policy" consideration is to remain
consistent with the principles, policies, presumptions, and rationales that underlie the
mandates of the Constitution. The fact that constitutional considerations are discussed
before public policy considerations is not necessarily to imply that the former are more
important than the latter.
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equal protection of the law.314 Included within this guarantee is a
presumption against the validity of classification based on gen-
der.315 This consideration clearly seems to assume tremendous
importance in determining whether the right to know should be
protected. Absent some sort of protection, the unwed mother
stands in a somewhat more advantageous position with respect to
her child than does the child's father-even if it is only the mere
knowledge that the child exists. 3'6 There is an argument-not
without merit-that, because of nature, the unwed mother and
the unwed father are not "similarly situated," and classifications
that distinguish them do not technically implicate the equal pro-
tection clause.31 7 However, the egalitarian principles embodied in
the clause suggest that the favored course of action is to afford
the same rights and privileges, so far as is practicable, to both
males and females-even when they are not, in a literal and
constitutional sense "similarly situated." 318 Therefore, the equal
protection clause seems to weigh in favor of providing some sort
of protection to the right to knov.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3 9 also
raises relevant considerations. As discussed earlier,3 20 the Supreme
Court has held that a parent's interest in the care, custody, and
1,4 See supra note 89 for the text of the equal protection clause.
311 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722-25 (1982); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84
(1973) (plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-78 (1971).
316 Some might object that in the case of infant adoption, the mother is not "better
off" than a father who is ignorant of his paternity. The mother will forever have to live
with the knowledge that there is somewhere a child that she bore, while the father is
"spared" the trauma if he never learns of the child's existence. Such an "argument"
merits little comment, for it is based on at least two faulty premises. First, the citizens of
this country have demonstrated their rejection of "ignorance is bliss" paternalism as an
acceptable course of action. Evidence of this fact includes, but is certainly not limited to:
the recent public outcry about the Iran-Contra scandal, public reaction to Watergate, covert
activities conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, electronic eavesdropping, mass
censorship, closed criminal trials, and-lest we forget-the ratification of the first amend-
ment's protection of freedom of speech and of the press. Second, failure to tell an unwed
father about his infant child's adoption deprives him of much more than the mere
knowledge of the child's existence. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
3,7 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-75 (1981); Gedulig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484, 490-93 (1974); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60-72 (1981).
3,, See supra note 317 and sources cited therein.
319 See supra note 92 for the text of the due process clause.
SSee supra notes 81-269 and accompanying text.
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rearing of his or her child ordinarily rises to the level of a liberty
interest that is protected by the due process clause. 321 In the
context of unwed fathers, the Court's decisions explicitly state
that unwed fathers also have a liberty interest in their children,
provided the requisite relationship between the father and the
child exists. 3" The opportunity to develop this liberty interest is
obviously cut off if the father is not informed of his child's
existence. By definition, the right to know is a necessary prereq-
uisite to the opportunity to develop a protected relationship be-
tween the father and the child. It can safely be assumed 3z that
the policies underlying the due process clause tend to favor af-
fording an individual the opportunity to develop a liberty interest
over denying such an opportunity to the individual. This points
toward the desirability of providing some sort of protection to
the right to know.
The constitutional right to privacy3' also gives rise to pertinent
considerations. Two aspects of the right to privacy seem to be
particularly relevant. First, the right to privacy clearly affords
some constitutional protection to the familial relationship. 325 But
which way does this cut? On the one hand, it appears to weigh
in favor of affording some sort of protection to the right to
know. The analysis here is similar to the above discussion con-
cerning the due process clause.32 The opportunity for an unwed
father to develop a familial relationship with his child-and there-
321 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968); Glona v. Americom Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
32 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-63 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 254-55 (1978); Stanley v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 645, 653-58 (1972).
- See J. ML, ON LmERTY 38-54 (1859).
'24 The constitutional basis on which the right to privacy rests is a matter of some
dispute. Its foundation has been attributed to the due process clause, the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights, the ninth amendment, or all or any combinations of the above. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972) (due process clause); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (penumbras'of the provisions of the Bill of Rights); id. at 487-
93 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (ninth amendment). The actual source of the right is not
critical to the present discussion. Consequently, no effort is made to identify its exact
constitutional foundation.
12 See May, 345 U.S. at 533; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
126 See supra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
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fore the opportunity to avail himself of whatever constitutional
rights might accompany such a relationship-is cut off unless he
is informed of his child's existence. On the other hand, the unwed
father traditionally has not been thought to be a member of the
child's "family."3 27 In contrast, both the unwed mother who does
not surrender the child for adoption and the adoptive parents of
surrendered children, have always been part of the child's "fam-
ily." 128 Therefore, at first blush, protecting the right to know
might initially seem inconsistent with affording constitutinal pro-
tection to either the unwed mother's, or the adoptive parents'
"family." Upon closer scrutiny, however, this proves not to be
the case. The right to know, as that term is used in this Note, is
a "passive right ' 329 in that it encompasses only an unwed father's
right to be informed of his child's existence; it does not necessarily
encompass an unwed father's right to interject himself into the
familial relationship between the child and the unwed mother (if
3" See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 272-75, 300-04 and accompanying text.
119 The distinction being made will need some elaboration. It is between "active
rights" and "passive rights." The former can be affirmatively exercised; they, in effect,
act as a license to take certain types of action with impunity. Examples are: the first
amendment's protection of free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, and right to petition; the second amendment's protection of the right to bear
arms, the right to travel, and the right to vote. Passive rights, in contrast, do not confer
a privilege of taking action; they instead proscribe the government from taking certain
action against, or require that it take certain action for the benefit of, either the citizenry
as a whole or as individuals. Examples include: the first amendment's proscription of an
establishment of religion; the third amendment's limitation on when soldiers may be
quartered in private homes without the owner's consent; the fourth amendment's prohi-
bition of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the eight amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. Some rights, particularly those that are limited to the criminal justice
system, have both "active" and "passive" characteristics; generally they are active in that
they must be asserted to avoid waiver, yet, once asserted, they assume a passive role.
Examples include: the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination; the sixth
amendment's right to a speedy trial; and the six and seventh amendments' right to a trial
by jury. The active/passive distinction should not be understated as a dichotomy; it is
more appropriately viewed as a continuum that is helpful in characterizing the nature of
a particular right. In the context of the present discussion, the right to know is "passive"
in that its protection imposes an obligation upon the government to inform an unwed
father of his child's existence; it is not "active" essentially because one could not "exercise"
it. By way of contrast, an unwed father's right to be heard at the proceeding relating to
the adoption of his child is "active"; its protection requires an affirmative act on his part.
Even consent rights to adoption are "active" in that an unwed father can block the
adoption of his child by withholding his consent.
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the mother does not surrender the child for adoption)330 or the
relationship between the child and the third-party adoptive parents
(if the child is surrendered for adoption). The right to know is
therefore not a "right to interfere." Consequently, protecting the
right to know would not intrude into the constitutionally protected
family decisions made by either the unwed mother or the adoptive
parents.331 The familial right to privacy, therefore, tends to weigh
somewhat in favor of providing protection of the right to know.
Second, under present constitutional doctrine, the right to
privacy provides some constitutional protection to family planning
decisions. 332 Most notably, a woman has the right to terminate a
pregnancy through an abortion, without regard to the preference
of her male partner in the conception process 3 3 Although the
right to an abortion is not absolute, 334 it clearly seems to weigh
against providing protection to the right to know.
There are, however, strong arguments to the contrary. The
right to know entails only the right to be informed of the child's
existence, not the right to be informed of the potential mother's
pregnancy. It vests only upon the birth of the child.335 By that
point, of course, the mother's termination rights no longer exist:
the right to terminate a pregnancy does not carry with it the right
to terminate a child's existence after birth. Because the right to
terminate a pregnancy and the right to know do not overlap at
any point in time, the existence and the protection of one could
reasonably be said to be irrelevant to the existence and the pro-
tection of the other. Furthermore, even if the right to know did
extend to a right to be informed of a pregnancy, the right to
1-1 Although full protection of the right to know would require notice of the child's
existence even when the child is not surrendered for adoption, the focus of this discussion
is on the right to know in cases in which the child is surrendered. See supra notes 40-81
and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 325 and sources cited therein.
32 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 382 (1979); Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61
(1976); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1972); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 483-85.
"I This is at least true through the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy. See Planned
Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 67-72.
34 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-57.
,"I See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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know, as noted earlier, 3 6 is merely passive-and would not in-
clude a right to interfere in the woman's decision to terminate
the pregnancy. Protection of one, therefore, is not inconsistent
with protection of the other.
The question is close, but for purposes of discussion it will
be assumed that the right to privacy's protection of a woman's
right to an abortion points away from affording protection to the
right to know. Because the question is so close, however, the
weight of this consideration on the analytical scales is somewhat
reduced.337
Other constitutional considerations should perhaps be noted.
To the extent their relevance is more questionable than the con-
stitutional considerations already discussed, 338 they are correspond-
ingly given less weight on the analytical scales.3 39
The eighth amendment34 provides protection against cruel and
unusual punishment341 This prohibition includes punishing some-
one for his or her "status. ' 342 Historically, one of the primary
justifications for not affording any rights to unwed fathers was
to "punish" them for their irresponsibility.3 43 To the extent that
this is punishment premised solely on one's "status" as an unwed
father, the eighth amendment seems to point toward providing
some protection to the right to know.344
The ninth amendment 345 might also figure into the analysis.
The ninth amendment reflects a policy of affording protection to
-6 See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
3" But see infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 313-31 and accompanying text.
"39 But see infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text.
-10 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII.
'" See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
-1 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
14 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
-4As for the argument that compelling an unwed mother to disclose the identity and
location of the unwed father would be a punishment on the basis of her status, see infra
note 421.
" The ninth amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
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rights not enumerated in the Constitution.34 To the extent that
the right to know is an unenumerated right, the ninth amendment
arguably places some weight, however miniscule, 47 on the side of
protecting the right to know.
B. Public Policy Considerations
Several public policy considerations are relevant to determin-
ing whether and to what extent the right to know should be
protected. Public policy considerations that overlap or are coex-
tensive with constitutional considerations, such as the interest in
the family unit, have already been discussed.3 4S The concern here
is with public policy considerations that do not necessarily impli-
cate interests that are protected or promoted by the Constitution.
Numerous public policy considerations arise from a state's
compelling interest in promoting the best interests of children 49
Of particular relevance to determining whether to provide protec-
tion to the right to know are the state's interests in: (1) encour-
aging an unwed mother to surrender her child for adoption when
it would be in the child's best interest; 350 (2) encouraging the
unwed mother to retain custody of the child when it would be in
the child's best interest;351 (3) placing the child with the person or
persons best suited to promote the child's best interest; 352 (4)
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring); J. ELY, DEmocRAcY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 34-40 (1980); R. PATTERSON, THE FORGOT-
TEN NINTH AmENu ENr 34-35 (1955); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 320 (1936); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ...
Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y. UNv. L. RE V. 787, 805-06 (1962); Comment, Sodomy
Statutes, the Ninth Amendment, and the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, 76 KY. L.J.
301, 305-10 (1987-88).
3,, But see infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 319-31 and accompanying text.
341 See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1980-81); D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-304 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74 (1981); MASs. GEN. LAws Am. ch. 210, §
3 (West Supp. 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (1980); see Comment, Delineation of the
Boundaries, supra note 1, at 292-321.
350 See L. BtuGass, supra note 9, at 21-27; Hoggett, Adoption Law: An Overview,
in ADOPTIoN: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL POLCY, LAW, AND SOCIOLOGY 135-44 (P. Bean ed. 1984);
Littner, The Natural Parents, in A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 30-33 (M. Schapiro ed.
1956).
35, See M. BENET, supra note 8, at 174-80; A. SoRosKY, A. BAPLAN, & R. PANNOR,
supra note 9, at 219-25.
35 See supra notes 350-51 and sources cited therein.
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carrying out the adoption procedure with maximum efficiency
and minimum administrative burden; 3 3 (5) ensuring finality in
adoption orders;3 4 and (6) providing for stability in the child's
life following an adoptionY.3 5 It now remains to ascertain whether
these factors weigh in favor of, or against, protecting the right
to know.
First, a state has an interest in encouraging an unwed mother
to surrender the child for adoption when the surrender would be
in the child's best interest.356 If an unwed mother who otherwise
would have placed the child up for adoption elects not to do so
solely because such surrender would mean that the unwed father
would have to be identified, the policy would be thwarted. This
clearly weighs against affording protection to the right to know.
On the other hand, full protection of the right to know would
not be limited to the adoption context.35 7 Consequently, if the
father is to be informed of the child's existence regardless of
whether the child is surrendered for adoption, the state's interest
in encouraging surrender would be irrelevant to the question of
whether the right to know should be protected. However, because
the discussion focuses on the right to know in the adoption
context, it will be assumed that the state's interest under consid-
eration here weighs against such protection.
Second, the state has an interest in encouraging an unwed
mother to retain custody of the child when retention would be in
the child's best interest.35 8 If full protection is afforded to the
right to know, of course, the state's interest would seem irrelevant
to the question of whether the right to know should be pro-
tected .3 9 This may not, however, be the case. In such a situation,
"3 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-92 (1979); H. KRAusE, supra note
165, at 48-53; Comment, supra note 73, at 582-86; Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Putting the
Genie Back in the Bottle, 15 Tosao L. Ra,. 1501, 1516-18 (1984).
- See Quilioin, 434 U.S. at 250-51; L. BuRGEs, supra note 9, at 28-36; Note,
Confirming the Constitutionality of Sealing Adoption Records: ALMA v. Mellon, 46
BROOKLYN L. Ray. 717, 723-24 (1980).
311 See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 54-59; Note, Lehr v. Robertson, supra note 23,
at 274.
3-6 See supra note 350 and sources cited therein.
I" See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
31 See supra note 351 and sources cited therein.
311 Full protection would necessitate that the father be told of the child's existence
regardless of whether the child was surrendered for adoption. See supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
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an unwed mother who might otherwise keep the child and not
inform the father might, if the unwed father is informed of the
child's existence, instead decide that retention of the child pre-
sented too much of a possibility of further undesired contact with
the father, and thereby elect to surrender the child.3 60 Thus, the
state's interest in promoting the best interests of the child might
not be served by protection of the right to know.
If the right is considered only in the adoption context, how-
ever, the analysis is somewhat different. As previously noted,36'
if the father will be informed of the child's existence only if the
child is surrendered for adoption, the mother might be more
likely to retain custody of the child. Just as this consequence
would be detrimental to the state's interest in encouraging surren-
der of the child when surrender is in the child's best interest, it
would nevertheless promote the state's interest in encouraging
retention of the child when retention is in the child's best inter-
est.362 Therefore, because the focus of the discussion is on the
right to know in the adoption context,3 63 the state's interest under
consideration here will be assumed to weigh in favor of affording
some protection to the right to know.
Third, if a child is surrendered for adoption, the state has an
interest in placing the child with the person or persons best suited
to promote the child's best interest.364 But on which side does this
3 If the father decides to attempt to establish a substantial relationship with his
child, the likelihood of ongoing contact with the mother-which both the male and the
female might otherwise wish to avoid-would be significantly, and perhaps inevitably,
increased.
361 See supra notes 356-57 and accomanying text.
- Admittedly, it is initially somewhat difficult to conceptualize a scenario in which
retention would be in the child's best interest, and encouragement, or even coercion, is
needed to persuade the mother to keep the child. One would think that in cases in which
the retention would be in the child's best interests, the mother would not surrender the
child for adoption, regardless of whether the right to know is protected. In such cases,
protection of the right to know would, of course, have neither a positive nor a negative
impact on the state interest under examination here. Nonetheless, there perhaps are cases
in which an unwed mother, for any number of reasons, might adopt a short-term per-
spective, when a more long-term view would reveal that retention of the child would prove
beneficial to the mother and best provide for the child's welfare. In any event, this factor
will not prove to be determinative in the present analysis. See infra notes 389-405 and
accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 350-51 and sources cited therein.
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interest tip the scale? On the one hand, informing the unwed
father of the existence of his child might provide the father with
an opportunity to seek to adopt the child himself. If the biological
father is the person best suited to provide for the surrendered
child's best interest, then protection of the right to know obviously
serves this state interest. On the other hand, the presumption that
a natural parent will best provide for a child's interest is no longer
universally accepted-if it ever was.SS Indeed, it is not difficult
to postulate cases in which it is obvious that a child's best interest
would be served by granting custody to third-party adoptive par-
ents over either or both biological parents.SS
Cases in which the child's best interest clearly would be served
by third-party adoptions, however, may also be cases in which
the unwed father would not seek to adopt the child. 367 Even if
this is not true, the conclusion is unchanged because the right to
know is passive, 36S and it does not give an unwed father the right
to be "first in line" for his child's adoption. Thus, protection of
the right to know would have no adverse impact on the state's
interest in placing a child with the person or persons best suited
to provide for the child's best interest. Furthermore, if all other
factors are equal,3 69 the natural parent is probably best equipped
to promote the child's best interest. 370 Therefore, the state's inter-
est in placing the child with the person or persons who will serve
the child's best interest weighs in favor of affording protection
to the right to know.
Fourth, the state has an interest in carrying out the adoption
procedure with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative
burden.3 71 Protection of the right to know would clearly have a
See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. Fa Um & A. Scmrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE Cimna 125-37 (1983); Muench & Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right,
13 FAm. L.Q. 129, 153 (1979).
366 See PASCALL, Adoption: Perspectives in Social Policy, in ADoPTIoN: ESSAYS IN
SociAL Poucy, LAW, AND SocioLoGY 9-11 (P. Bean ed. 1984).
6 See B. HmscH, LIVING ToGETHER: A GUIDE TO ThE LAW FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES
28-30 (1976); S. KATz & M. I~NcaR, supra note 3, at 9-10.
1 See supra note 329.
'" See H. KRAUSE, supra note 165, at 18-22; Note, Ohio's Fxception to Consent in
Adoption Proceedings: A Need for Legislative Action, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 348, 351
(1985).
I" But see J. GomSTEI, A FREUD, & A. ScwMrr, supra note 365, at 128-42.
1'7 See supra note 353 and sources cited therein.
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detrimental impact on the state's interest if the unwed father
would not otherwise be given notice of the adoption under state
law372 or if ascertaining the identity or location of the father
would consume considerable time. However, the discussion here
focuses on those cases in which the father would be given notice
of the adoption and the identity and location of the father are
readily known to the mother. 373 In such cases, protection of the
right to know would not adversely impact on the state's interest
in efficiency and administration convenience.37 4 Nonetheless, it
will be assumed that this state interest weighs against protecting
the right to know.375
Fifth, the state has an interest in ensuring the finality of
adoption orders. 376 To some extent, protection of the right to
know is irrelevant to this interest. Presumably, the unwed father
would receive notice of the child's existence prior to the adoption
decree.377 Yet even if notice is received subsequent to the decree,
the father could not detrimentally impact upon the state interest
in finality: the right to know, it will be recalled, is merely pas-
sive,378 and its protection gives no right to challenge the finality
of an adoption decree.
In fact, the state's interest in finality seems to weigh in favor
of protecting the right to know. An unwed father who is informed
of his child's existence prior to the adoption is given an oppor-
tunity to decide whether he will seek to adopt the child himself.
He will therefore be less likely to attempt to challenge the finality
of an adoption decree than he would if he actually first learned
of the child's existence after the decree has been entered. 379 In
37 Such protection would then become the only thing that precluded him from having
an opportunity to learn of his child's existence. It would always-or usually-involve more
work on the part of the court in which the proceedings are to be held.
73 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
374 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653-55.
371 But see supra note 308.
376 See supra note 354 and sources cited therein.
" State statutes regarding the confidentiality of adoption records would seem to
preclude protection of the right to know after the conclusion of the adoption proceeding.
Moreover, the right to know assumes its greatest importance prior to an adoption. See
supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
3's See supra note 335.
39 The greater reluctance present in the latter situation would stem from the fact that
he had an opportunity to obtain a different outcome in the adoption proceeding.
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this respect, the state interest in finality of adoption would be
better served by affording protection to the right to know.
Sixth, and finally, the state has an interest in ensuring that
the child's post-adoption life will be as stable as possible. State
statutes providing for the confidentiality of adoption records serve
to further this interest. 80 On one level, protection of the right to
know would be irrelevant to this state interest: if the unwed father
is informed of the child's existence prior to the adoption, the
right to know will have been protected, but the father will have
no right of access to the adoption records once the decree is
entered. 381 The danger that the unwed father will seek access to
such confidential information is no greater than the danger that
the unwed mother will do so.382
If the father is informed of the child's existence after the
adoption decree is entered, there is a chance that he will seek
access to confidential documents in an attempt to find the child.
If he is successful, there is a chance that he will contact the child
and possibly disrupt the child's life and hinder the state's interest
in ensuring post-adoption stability.3 83 This danger is already pres-
ent with respect to the unwed mother.3 4 If the father is informed
of the child's existence prior to the adoption, he will be less likely
to attempt to disrupt the child's post-adoption life than he would
be if he discovered the fact after the adoption. The father will
already have had the opportunity to decide whether to seek to
adopt the child, and the possibility of future interference in the
child's life is thereby reduced-placing the father in somewhat
3m See supra note 300 and sources cited therein.
38 See id.
31 Using the quantity of reported cases as a measure, there is no evidence that in
those states that do not close the adoption files to an unwed mother there has been a
problem with the frequency with which unwed mothers exercise such a privilege. In those
states that close the file even to the mother, there is no evidence that unwed fathers seek
to obtain access to such a file more often than do unwed mothers. But see In re Adoption
of Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378, 391 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983) (unwed father denied access to adoption records).
3 See Comment, Delineation of the Boundaries, supra note 1, at 291-93.
n4 This is particularly true in states that do not include the unwed mother within the
class of persons to whom access to adoption records is denied.
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the same position as the unwed mother. 385 Although the question
is perhaps close, the state's interest in ensuring stability in an
adopted child's life tends to weigh in favor of affording some
protection to the right to know.
Beyond the state's interest in promoting the best interests of
children, one other public policy consideration is perhaps relevant
to the determination of whether the right to know should be
protected. A state, although it cannot constitutionally burden the
right to obtain an abortion, 386 can nonetheless decide that en-
couraging abortions is against its public poicy.38 7 If a state has
so decided, then protecting the right to know would arguably
undermine the state's interest: women who otherwise would have
carried a child to full term might, if they know the father will be
informed of the child's existence, instead elect to obtain an abor-
tion. The state's interest in not encouraging abortion, therefore,
weighs against affording protection to the right to know. 388
C. Balancing the Considerations
The following constitutional considerations have been identi-
fied as weighing to some degree in favor of protecting the right
to know: (1) the equal protection clause's policy against gender
discrimination; (2) the due process clause's protection of a par-
ent's liberty interest in his or her child; (3) the constitutional
protection derived from the right to privacy in the familial rela-
tionship; and, to a lesser degree, (4) the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) the ninth amendment's
protection of rights not enumerated in the Constitution. 389
The public policy considerations that tend to weigh in favor
of protecting the right to know-at least when the right is af-
forded protection prior to the child's adoption-have been iden-
tified as follows: (1) the state's interest in encouraging unwed
- Each will have had an opportunity to make a decision as to whether third-party
adoption was appropriate; each will have to live with and accept the decisions he or she
made; and, there is little that either can do even if they change their minds.
3m See Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 71. This is at least true with respect to the
first twelve weeks of the pregnancy. See id.
37 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-78 (1977).
But see supra note 308.
See supra notes 314-31, 340-47 and accompanying text.
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mothers to retain custody of a child when retention is in the
child's best interest; (2) the state's interest in placing a child who
has been surrendered for adoption with the person or persons
best suited to provide for the child's best interest; (3) the state's
interest in ensuring the finality of adoption decrees; and (4) the
state's interest in ensuring stability in an adopted child's life.39
The constitutional consideration that has been shown to weigh
against protecting the right to know is a woman's right, derived
from the right to privacy, to obtain an abortion.391 The public
policy considerations that weigh against affording protection to
the right to know have been identified as: (1) the state's interest
in encouraging surrender of the child for adoption when surrender
is in the child's best interest; (2) the state's interest in the efficiency
and administrative convenience of adoption proceedings; and (3)
the state's interest in not encouraging abortions.3 2
The question remains how heavily these considerations weigh
on the analytical scales. The two most obvious approaches would
be to give each consideration equal weight or to give the consti-
tutional considerations proportionally more weight than the other
considerations identified. If equal weight was given to each con-
sideration, the balance would tip decidedly in favor of the desir-
ability of protecting the right to know.393 Such an approach,
however, appears clearly inappropriate. 394 If, alternatively, the
"constitutional considerations," by virtue of their status as such,395
were to be given proportionately396 more weight than the "public
'9' See supra notes 358-70, 375-85 and accompanying text.
M' See supra notes 332-37 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 356-57, 371-75, 380-88 and accompanying text.
391 If one unit of weight were to be given to each consideration discussed, the balance
would tip, nine to four, in favor of protecting the right to know.
'19 For example, giving the ninth amendment and the equal protection clause the same
amount of weight on the analytical scales would be exceedingly hard to justify.
I" But see supra note 313.
196 The initial difficulty with this approach reveals itself immediately. How much more
important than a "mere" public policy consideration is a consideration labeled "constitu-
tional"? The approach would necessitate the use of a formula such as a(x) =y, where "x"
equals a public policy consideration, "y" equals a constitutional consideration, and "a"
equals the proportion by which constitutional considerations predominate over public policy
considerations. For example, 2(x) =y would mean that each consitutional consideration is
given twice as much weight on the analytical scale than each of the public policy consid-
erations. The difficulty is in the premise that "a" would remain constant for each
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policy considerations," the balance tips more clearly in favor of
affording protection to the right to know.3 7 This approach too,
might be unacceptable.3 91
Ideally, the best approach would be to assign to each individ-
ual consideration its proper weight in relation to the other iden-
tified considerations 9.3  The obvious practical problem with this
approach is its subjectivity: it is entirely too susceptible of ends-
oriented reasoning.4w For this reason, this approach will not be
utilized.
Because the two approaches that have already been discussed
lead to the conclusion that the right to know should be protected,
it may be helpful to determine what would be necessary before
the opposite conclusion-that the right to know should not be
protected-would be reached. To illustrate: if every factor weigh-
ing against the desirability of protecting the right to know were
given fifty percent more weight than every factor that weighed in
favor of such protection, 401 the scale would still tip in favor of
constitutional consideration as against each public policy consideration. It would make
little sense, for instance, to say that the ninth amendment weighs as heavily against the
state interest in encouraging adoptions as does the due process clause.
19 If, for example, the formula 2(x) = y were used, see supra note 396, the consequence
would be that each constitutional consideration is given two units of weight, while each
public policy consideration is given one unit of weight. The result would then be fourteen
to five, in favor of protecting the right to know.
391 One problem with this approach is discussed supra note 396. Another is its
subjectivity. See infra note 400. Probably the most damaging criticism of the approach,
however, is that it is a poor substitute for reasoned analysis.
I" For example, one might use a 10-point scale, assign to each consideration its value
relative to the other relevant considerations, and then place them all on the analytical
balance. To illustrate: for each of the following considerations, its respective assigned
relative weight is contained in parentheses immediately thereafter: equal protection (8); due
process (7); constitutional protection of the family (8); constitutional protection of the
right to seek and to obtain an abortion (8); eighth amendment (2); ninth amendment (1);
encouraging surrender for adoption (8); encouraging retention (8); seeking the best parents
(8); administrative convenience (7); interest in finality (6); interest in stability (6); discour-
aging abortion (6). When each consideration is then placed on the appropriate side of the
analytical balance, the result is that it tips, 54 to 29, in favor of protecting the tight to
know.
40 The inherent subjective nature of this approach was perhaps best illustrated to the
author when he undertook it himself. The results are set forth at supra note 399. This is
not, of course, to imply that there is necessarily anything questionable about the result the
author reached; however, when an analysis leads to the conclusion that one expected to
reach, the conclusion should perhaps be viewed with some suspicion.
41 For example, all the considerations identified as weighing in favor of protecting
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affording protection to the right to know.402 In fact, substantially
more weight than fifty percent would have to be given to the
factors weighing against the protection of the right to know before
equilibrium would be reached.403
Given the foregoing analysis, the contention that the right to
know should not be afforded some protection probably cannot
be sustained on any principled basis..4 It stretches the imagina-
tion, for example, to suggest that a state's interest in administra-
tive convenience and efficiency with respect to adoption proceedings
is over fifty percent more important than the equal protection
clause's policy against gender discrimination. The law, inciden-
tally, is clearly to the contrary.40 Suffice to say that anyone
wishing to sustain the assertion that the right to know should not
be protected carries an extremely heavy burden indeed. The con-
clusion seems inescapable that the right to know should be pro-
tected.
V. Tm RIGHT TO KNOW: CAN IT BE PROTECTED?
Any attempt to protect the right to know has several hurdles
to overcome before it can be said to provide such protection in
fact. Numerous difficulties arise and must be dealt with, and
several competing interests must be reconciled. Before proposing
a statutory means by which the right to know can be afforded
the right to know are assigned a weight of 5, while each consideration weighing against
protecting the right to know is assigned a weight of 7.5.
4m Using the assigned weights in note 401 supra, for example, the result would be
that the balance tips, 45 to 30, in favor of protecting the right to know.
For instance, if all of the considerations weighing against protection of the right
to know are each assigned over double the weight of each consideration weighing in favor
of such protection, only then would the analytical scales once again become evenly
balanced. To illustrate, if each pro-protection consideration was assigned a weight of 5,
and all anti-protection considerations were each assigned a respective weight of 11.25, the
scales would then become evenly balanced, with a weight of 45 on each side.
• m The reader is cautioned to remember that the analytical approach just discussed
was, for purposes of this Note, simplified, in that the illustrations of the approach in
operation used what might be considered to be averages of the respective values, In the
illustration contained at supra note 401, for example, the analysis was :undertaken as if
the considerations weighing in favor of protecting the right to know averaged out to a
weight of 5, the anti-protection considerations averaging out to a weight of 7.5. Each
individual's personal analysis would necessarily have to be considerably more complex.
See, e.g., supra note 399.
401 See, e.g., Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-77.
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protection,46 it is helpful to identify first the problems one en-
counters in attempting to provide such protection.
The most obvious requirement that a statute purporting to
protect the right to know4 must meet is that such a statute must
40 An example of such a statute is set forth infra note 407. However, regardless of
how one feels, as a personal matter, about whether and to what extent the right to know
should be protected, there remains the possibility that it might eventually be held to be of
constitutional dimensions. See supra notes 201-69 and accompanying text. If this occurs,
a state or, conceivably, the federal government, must find a means to protect the right.
Accordingly, one should examine a proposed right to know statute from two distinct
perspectives: (1) whether, in the absence of constitutional protection for the right to know,
the statute is desirable; and (2) whether, if the right to know is held to be protected by
the Constitution, the statute is acceptable as a means of providing such protection.
Furthermore, the statute need not be enacted in its entirety to provide protection to the
right to know; some protection is better than no protection. The statute set forth infra
note 407 was drafted, to the extent practicable, to afford maximum protection to the right
to know. It was also designed so that its harshness-to the extent it embodies any-can
be mitigated by revision without disrupting the statutory scheme. In addition, the proposed
statute was designed so that, with slight rewording of its language, entire portions of it
could be deleted entirely, while preserving its basic structure.
The following right to know statute will be used as a basis for comparison:
§ 0000: Informing Father of Child Born Out-Of-Wedlock of Child's Pro-
spective Adoption
(A) When an infant child born out-of-wedlock is surrendered by its
natural mother for adoption, the court in which the adoption proceeding
has been or is to be commenced shall:
(1) Ascertain the identity of the child's natural father, in the manner
and subject to the limitations as set forth in subsection (B);
(2) Ascertain the present whereabouts of the child's natural father, in
the manner and subject to the limitations as set forth in subsection
(B); and
(3) Provide actual notice of the child's prospective adoption to the
natural father, in the manner as set forth in subsection (C).
(B) The following shall govern the manner in which the inquiry called
for under subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) shall be made:
(1) If, after consulting the child's birth certificate, the court, in its
discretion, believes that the information contained therein is sufficient
to enable the court to provide actual notice of the prospective adoption
to the natural father, the court shall cause such notice to be provided
to the father, in the manner set forth in subsection (C), and shall not
question the natural mother or any other person directly in an effort
to ascertain the identity or present whereabouts of the natural father.
(2) If, after consulting the child's birth certificate, the court believes
that the information contained therein is insufficient to enable the
court to provide actual notice of the prospective adoption to the
natural father, in the manner as set forth in subsection (C), or if,
after the court has consulted the child's birth certificate and subse-
quently attempted to provide actual notice of the prospective adoption
to the natural father, in the manner as set forth in subsection (C), it
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do what it purports to do: it must provide effective protec-
appears that the natural father did not in fact receive such notice, the
court shall question the natural mother directly, under oath, in an
effort to ascertain the identity and present whereabouts of the natural
father.
(a) In questioning the natural mother, the court shall:
(i) inquire into any information that is known, or with the exercise
of due diligence could reasonably be expected to become known, to
the natural mother that would enable the court to determine the
identity or present whereabouts of the natural father, provided that
the court shall not inquire into any matter beyond that which is
reasonably necessary to such a determination;
(ii) inform the natural mother that if she, with an intent to deceive
or mislead the court, omits or lies about information that a reasonable
person would believe was requested by the court and would prove
useful in determining the identity or present whereabouts of the nat-
ural father,
(A) she will become subject to imprisonment for a period not to exceed [two
years], become criminally liable for a sum not to exceed [five thousand
dollars], or both;
(B) other persons who might be able to provide such information may be
called before the court and questioned; and
(C) such information as is available to the court may be used to provide
constructive notice by publication to the natural father, and that such infor-
mation may include, but is not limited to, the natural mother's name, her
address, and the approximate date on which the child was conceived; and
(iii) inform the natural mother that if the information she supplies to
the court provides an insufficient basis for determining the identity or
present whereabouts of the natural father, the court may take the
action specified in subsections (B)(2)(a)(ii)(B) and (B)(2)(a)(ii)(C).
(b) If, after questioning the natural mother in the manner as set forth in
subsection (B)(2)(a), the court is unable to ascertain the identity and
present whereabouts of the natural father, and the court believes that
such failure is due, in whole or in part, to the natural mother's intentional
deception of the court, the court shall report such deception to [the
appropriate prosecutorial agency].
(c) If, after questioning the natural mother in the manner as set forth in
subsection (B)(2)(a), the court is unable to ascertain the identity and
present whereabouts of the natural father, the court in all cases may,
and, if such action appears reasonably likely to provide the court with
the identity or present whereabouts of the natural father, shall call before
it any person or persons who appear reasonably likely to possess relevant
information, and question each such person, under oath, as to this
information.
(d) If, after questioning the natural mother in the manner as set forth in
subsection (b)(2)(a), and taking such further action as provided for in
subsection (B)(2)(c), the court is unable to ascertain the identity and
present whereabouts of the natural father, the court in all cases may,
and, if such actions appear reasonably likely to provide notice of the
prospective adoption to the natural father, shall cause notice of the
prospective adoption to be placed in any periodical or periodicals that
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could reasonably be expected to provide notice of the prospective adoption
to the natural father.
(i) Such notice may contain any information that appears reasonably
useful in providing the natural father with notice of the prospective
adoption, and shall, in all cases, contain the natural mother's name,
her address, and the approximate date on which the child was con-
ceived.
(ii) Such notice may be placed in any periodical or periodicals circu-
lated in the jurisdiction
(A) in which the adoption proceeding is pending;
(B) in which the mother's residence at the approximate time the child was
conceived is located;
(C) in which a suspected natural father's last known residence is located;
and
(D) in which a suspected natural father is currently believed to reside.
(3) If, after questioning the natural mother, in the manner as set forth
in subsection (B)(2)(a), and taking such further action as provided for in
subsection (3)(2)(a), the court determines that the identity of the natural
father is in fact unknown, it shall provide actual notice of the prospective
adoption to all persons whom the court determines could potentially be
the natural father, in the manner as set forth in subsection (C).
(4) If the present whereabouts of any person whom the court determines
to be a potential natural father under subsection 03)(3) are in fact
unknown, the court shall provide constructive notice by publication to
such a person, in the manner as set forth in subsection (B)(2)(d).
(C) When actual notice is to be provided to a person determined to be a
natural father under subsection (B)(1) or (B)(2), or any person determined
to be a potential natural father under subsection (B)(3), such notice
(1) Shall be served in either of the following manners:
(a) Sent, via certified mail, to the target, or
(b) Hand-delivered by [the sheriff] in whose jurisdiction the target
resides;
(2) Shall contain, but is not limited to containing, the following information:
(a) the name of the natural mother;
(b) the present address of the natural mother;
(c) the approximate date on which the child was conceived;
(d) the date or dates on which any hearings regarding the adoption
of the child will or is expected to take place;
(e) the birthdate of the child;
(f) the gender of the child; and
(g) whether the target has been identified on the child's birth certificate
as the child's natural father;
(3) May be sent to the target's currently known address, the target's last
known address, and the last known address of any person or persons whom
the court determines would provide the target with the information contained
in such notice, providing that such notice shall be sent only to the target's
current address if the court determines that such action is certain to provide
the target with actual notice.
It should be noted that the statute is directed toward protecting the right to know in
the adoption context, which has formed the basis for this Note's discussion. See supra
notes 57-78 and accompanying text. The right to know properly so called, however, extends
far beyond the adoption area. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text. The proposed
statute is not directed toward protection of the right to know in any of these other areas.
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tion.4 °8 If such a statute is so fiddled with exceptions that an unwed
father's right to know of his child's existence could be circum-
vented in the typical case,4 the effort to protect the right might
well be doomed from the outset.410 Effective protection must be
provided for in the statute, 41' especially in those cases in which
the right to know assumes its most critical importance.412
A statute that otherwise would provide effective protection to
the right to know must be enforceable.41 3 The enforcement mech-
"I The Proposed Statute, supra note 407, provides effective protection by requiring-
so far as is reasonably possible-actual notice of the child's existence to the father or
those persons who may be the child's father prior to the commencement of the adoption
proceedings. The effectiveness of the protection offered by the statute is further enhanced
by the enforcement mechanism that is provided for. See infra notes 413-14 and accompa-
nying text.
It should, however, be noted that while the statute ideally requires that the father be
informed of the child's existence prior to the commencement of the adoption proceedings,
its plain language forecloses any argument that the commencement of adoption proceedings
dispenses with the requirement that the unwed father be informed of the child's existence.
The responsibility for informing the father falls to "the court in which the adoption
proceeding has been or is to be commenced." Proposed Statute, supra note 407, at §
000(A).
Furthermore, the statute supplies a means by which an unwed father's right to know
may be protected when his identity or present whereabouts are unknown to the unwed
mother. See id. at § 0000(B)(3-4). Certain provisions of the statute would require a judge
to take steps beyond that which might be necessary to provide actual notice to the father.
In certain questionable cases, therefore, the statute compels the judge to "overact," rather
than "underact" in an attempt to provide notice to the father. See id. at § 0000(c)(3).
"I "Typical case" is here referring to the type of case which has been the focus of
this Note's discussion. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text; infra note 415.
40 The fact that a statute will be subject to exceptions does not, without more,
necessarily counsel against its enactment. It is difficult to conceive of any law-whether
statutory, common, or constitutional-that does not permit exceptions.
4" Even in other areas of unwed fathers' rights, protection often falls far short of
being "effective." See, e.g., supra notes 272-304 and accompanying text.
4,2 See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
413 The Proposed Statute, supra note 407, enforces its protection of the right to know
in several respects. Its most obvious enforcement mechanism is the creation of a criminal
offense for unwed mothers who fail to comply with its requirements. See Proposed Statute,
supra note 407, at § 0000(B)(2)(a)(ii-iii). The statute recognizes, of course, that the criminal
penalties can vary according to what the legislature deems appropriate. The legislature
would also have to specify to what office or offices the court must report an unwed
mothers' noncompliance, see id. at § 0000(B)(2)(a)(iii), and what official or officials would
be responsible for actually delivering notice to the unwed father, see id. at § 0000(C)(1)(b).
It is also noteworthy that the statute provides that the appropriate court may, and in
some cases, must, take certain action without regard to whether the unwed mother bears
any responsibility (other than her inability to say with certainty who the father is or where
he can be located) for the court's failure to discover the identity or present whereabouts
of the natural father. See id. at § 0000(B)(2)(c-d), (B)(3)-(4).
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anism is, therefore, the second essential component of any attempt
to protect the right to know.41 4
The two necessary requirements of a right to know statute
just discussed 415 are self-evident, but what other standards must
such a statute416 meet? The statute must not, contravene any
provision of the Constitution.417 The equal protection clause,
418
414 Actually, the distinction between "effectiveness of protection" and "enforcement"
should not be overemphasized. While the latter can exist without the former, the converse,
it is submitted, is probably not true.
411 Subsection (C) of the Proposed Statute provides the means of providing notice to
the unwed father. This subsection enhances both the statute's effectiveness of protection
and its enforcement mechanism. While the subsection is relatively straightforward, one
provision perhaps calls for a little elaboration: subsection (C)(3) might have particular
application to cases in which the target is relatively young. For example, if he has moved
out of his parents' house to attend school, the statute would presumably be met if the
notice was provided to his parents.
416 Although the application of the statute set forth at supra note 407 is relatively
narrow, the same statute could easily serve as a model for a much broader protection of
the right to know. For example, while the statute focuses on the adoption of newborns,
its reasoning and application could be extended to older children. Indeed, "infant child,"
as used in subsection (A) of the statute is left undefined; the legislature could choose to
encompass older children within its scope.
In addition, although the statute is limited to cases in which an illegitimate child is
surrendered for adoption by the natural mother, it could, with minor revision, be extended
to cover cases in which a legitimate child is surrendered for adoption and/or cases in
which the child is surrendered for adoption by persons other than the natural mother.
Some, but probably not all, portions of the statute's protection of the right to know could
even be revised so as to extend to cases in which the child is retained by the mother.
417 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-94 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 652-55 (1972).
418 See supra note 89 for the text of the equal protection clause. Several cases would
seem to indicate that the Proposed Statute, supra note 407, would not contravene the
equal protection clause. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), established that burdens
placed on only one unwed parent by virtue of the differences in the respective parents'
relationships to the child do not violate the equal protection clause. See supra notes 196-
200 and accompanying text. The Court has clearly stated that a statute can survive scrutiny
under the equal protection clause if it is based on the physiological fact that only women
can become pregnant. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-72 (1981).
Indeed, under present equal protection doctrine, the proposed statute might not even
classify on the basis of gender at all: the relevant distinction would instead be between
persons who surrender an illegitimate child for adoption and those who do not. Cf.
Gedudig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 487-90 (1974) (relevant classification was between
pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons, rather than between men and women).
Even if the statute is viewed as a gender-based classification, however, it might well
pass the Craig test by "substantially advancing" the "important" state interests of main-
taining the integrity of the family, protecting the potential relationship between an unwed
father and his child, and/or ensuring the finality of adoption decrees.
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the due process clause,419 and the right to privacy420 might be of
particular concern in this connection. 42'
In addition, a number of public policy considerations, dis-
cussed in the previous section, were identified as perhaps weigh-
ing, to varying degrees, against affording any protection to the
right to know. 422 If a right to know statute would detrimentally
infringe upon one or more of the identified state interests, the
,,9 See supra note 92 for the text of the due process clause. The Proposed Statute,
supra note 407, would survive scrutiny under the due process clause. In terms of procedural
due process, the statute entails no deprivations of property interests. As for liberty interests,
an unwed mother would, of course, suffer a deprivation if criminal penalties were imposed
on her for her failure to comply with the statute; however, she would be entitled to all
the procedures mandated under the due process clause prior to such a deprivation.
In terms of substantive due process, the question is closer, but none of the Court's
family planning decisions are on point or compel the conclusion that the statute is
constitutionally defective, see sources cited supra notes 321, 332; nor does it impair.any
other fundamental right, see sources cited supra note 325; see also Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 56-61 (1973) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31
(1969) (right to interstate travel); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (right
of access to courts).
4, See supra note 324. The Proposed Statute, supra note 407, would not impermissibly
infringe upon the right to privacy. Indeed, the statute attempts to strike a balance between
providing maximum protection to the right to know and, as much as possible, .still respect
the privacy interests of the person involved. See Proposed Statute, supra note 407, at §
OOOO(B)(I)-(2)(a)(i), (C)(3).
-1 It is clear that the Proposed Statute would not violate either the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment or the eighth amendment. With respect to the former, the
Proposed Statute imposes criminal consequences only if there is an affirmative act or
omission, in communicative form, on the part of the unwed mother, coupled with an
intent to deceive or mislead. True information elicited from the mother, even if compelled,
would not incriminate her. The fact that the elicited information might be such that she
would have preferred not to disclose it is irrelevant with regard to the self-incrimination
clause. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896). See generally L. LEvy, OImans oF TH FiFm AMENDmENT: Tim RiGHT AGAiNsT
SELF-INCRUMNAnON 405-32 (1986). Criminal penalties are implicated only if she presents
false testimony, which is a crime anyway under state perjury statutes, and is not affected
by the self-incrimination clause; the fifth amendment does not confer a "right to lie." Cf.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) ("[w]hatever the scope of a constitutional right to
testify, it is elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely") (emphasis
in original). There is also no valid argument that the statute would violate the eighth
amendment by punishing the status of "unwed mother." See Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962). The statute does not punish one for her status as an unwed mother.
Rather, the statute provides punitive sanctions for the affirmative act of deceiving the
court; the fact that the offense can be committed only by unwed mothers is irrelevant. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality). Therefore, there is no eighth amendment
violation.
41 See supra notes 356-57, 371-75, 380-88 and accompanying text.
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attempt to protect the right to know perhaps should be aban-
doned.42
In particular, it must be determined what adverse effect a
right to know statute would have on: the state's interest in en-
couraging an unwed mother to surrender her child for adoption,
when surrender is in the best interest of the child;424 the state's
interest in efficiency and administrative convenience in adoption
proceedings; 425 and, the state's interest in not encouraging abor-
tions. 426
Finally, a right to know statute must be examined to ascertain
whether any other negative consequences would flow from its
enactment. 427 In other words, the statute must be sufficiently
tailored to serve its desired end, 42 If it would open the floodgates
to undesirable consequences, such ramifications might counsel
against its enactment.
CONCLUSION
In some ways, unwed fathers have come a long way with
respect to rights regarding their children, There is no question
that they stand in a far more advantageous position than they
did only a few years ago, Despite our progressiveness, however,
one major obstacle-whether its foundation lies in nature, soci-
ology, or the law-prevents unwed fathers from ever achieving a
parental status comparable to that of their female counterparts:
413 This is a judgment call. The fact that one of these considerations would be
impacted upon is not determinative. The question rather is whether and to what extent
enactment of a right to know statute would preclude .a state from achieving its desired
end.
44 $ge supro notes 356-57 and accompanying text,
4See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text,
4See .esupra notes 380-88 and accompanying text,
47 Common experience shows that any number of acts can, and often do, result in
unforeseen-and, in many cases, unforeseeble-consequences. The enactment of a statute
is no exception, No attempt, therefore, has been made to anticipate what incidental
consequences would flow from the enactment of a right to know statute. The concern has
been only on the protection of the right to know's impact on those areas, particularly
adoption, upon which it is supposed to impact,
" This statement should not be read to imply that a right to know statute should be
subjected to a "strict scrutiny" test, which requires that a statute serve a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that objective. See, e.g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the knowledge of their parenthood. This Note has examined
whether and to what extent an unwed father does, and should,
have a legal right to be informed of his child's existence. Nowhere
is the protection of this right more critical than in cases in which
a newborn infant, whose very existence is unknown to his or her
father, is surrendered for adoption by the child's mother. The
unknowing father forever loses every opportunity to experience
the joys and heartaches of accompanying his son or daughter
through his or her life-being there and watching as the child
grows from infancy to adulthood.
Why was he not told? A different answer is supplied every
time it is asked-with justifications ranging from the understand-
able to the absurd, with rationalizations ranging from protective-
ness to pure self-centeredness, and with motivations ranging from
the most altruistic to the most evil. The decision to surrender a
child for adoption without informing the father is undoubtedly
one of the most difficult decisions the mother will be forced to
make in her life-implicating the entire spectrum of feelings,
fears, and emotions. Yet, in the final analysis, the reasons for
the decision-whatever their apparent validity-seem to pale in
comparison to the consequences thereof. The effect on the father
is the same regardless of reasons given for making the decision,
The unilateral decision by one individual to deprive a person of
the opportunity to know his child-without any showing of fault
on the part of the person so deprived-would not, it is submitted,
be accepted-or tolerated-in any other context. It is difficult to
see why the legal status of an "unmarried male" serves to alter
our perceptions. The real question seems not to be whether the
right to know should be protected, but rather why it has taken
us so long to ensure that it is.
John R. Hamilton
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